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Res judicata is hard enough already. Consider it at the
interjurisdictional level, and we are asking for headaches. But con-
sider it at that level we must, because litigation trends make in-
terjurisdictional preclusion1 more important than ever. Lawyers,
judges, litigants, and other litigation participants increasingly must
contemplate the possibility that a lawsuit will have claim-preclusive
or issue-preclusive effect in a subsequent suit in another
jurisdiction.
With great frequency, multiple lawsuits arise out of single or re-
lated transactions or events. Mass tort litigation and complex com-
mercial litigation provide the most emphatic examples, but the
phenomenon of multiple related lawsuits extends to every corner of
litigation, including intellectual property,2 matrimonial,3 criminal, 4
* Assistant Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A. 1985, Harvard;
J.D. 1990, NYU. - Ed. I am grateful to Michelle Adams, Ahmed Bulbulia, Stephen
Burbank, Andrea Catania, Edward Hartnett, Michael Risinger, Linda Silberman, Allan
Stein, and Charles Sullivan for their generous and insightful comments; to Esther Cohen,
Joseph Hanlon, and Patrick O'Byrne for their excellent research assistance; and to the Seton
Hall Law School faculty scholarship fund for financial support of this project.
1. By "interjurisdictional preclusion," I am referring to the binding effect of a judgment
on subsequent judicial proceedings in other jurisdictions. My focus is on the binding effect of
a judgment as a matter of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. This article seeks to build on
important work done by others concerning interjurisdictional preclusion. Especially, it tries
to build on the work started by Ronan E. Degnan in Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE LJ.
741 (1976), and continued by Stephen B. Burbank in Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith
and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CoRNuE. L. REv. 733
(1986).
2. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (involv-
ing multiple patent infringement actions brought by a purported patentholder); Stevenson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same).
3. See, e.g., Brennan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1996) (involving a divorce proceeding
and separately filed marital tort complaint alleging domestic violence).
4. See, e.g., Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987) (involving a private civil RICO
litigation following a criminal RICO conviction); Texaco, Inc. v. Borda, 383 F.2d 607 (3d Cir.
1967) (involving parallel civil and criminal proceedings); Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC036876,
1997 WL 45143 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 4,1997) (involving a wrongful death tort suit following a
murder acquittal).
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antitrust,5 personal injury,6 securities,7 commercial,8 products liabil-
ity,9 environmental, 10 and civil rights."
The participants in those multiple related lawsuits, moreover,
increasingly find themselves litigating in far-flung forums. With
continuing advances in transportation and communication, growing
nationalization and internationalization of commerce, and an in-
creasingly mobile society resulting in geographically dispersed fam-
ily and business networks, it is hardly surprising that related
lawsuits crop up in multiple jurisdictions. Furthermore, related
lawsuits frequently are filed in both state and federal courts. Thus,
controversies become multijurisdictional across two dimensions -
"horizontally" among different state courts and "vertically" be-
tween state and federal courts.
The problem of related lawsuits in multiple forums is exacer-
bated by our legal system's failure to provide adequate aggregation
mechanisms for consolidating widespread litigation.12 A recent
spate of reversals of mass tort class certifications 13 drives home the
point that litigants often must endure multiple closely related law-
suits, rather than resolving the entire controversy in one action.
Proposed aggregation mechanisms that would allow the consolida-
5. See, e.g., Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) (involving parallel civil and
criminal antitrust proceedings); Battle v. Liberty Natl. Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877 (11th Cir.
1989) (involving parallel federal and state antitrust suits).
6. See, e.g., In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993); Childers v.
F.A.F. Motor Cars, Inc., 319 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (involving a motor vehicle
accident).
7. See, e.g., In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 568 F. Supp. 1250
(J.P.M.L. 1983); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
8. See, e.g., Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509 (N.J. 1995)
(involving an action to reform a car-dealership lease and a separate attorney-malpractice suit
for negligence in preparing the lease).
9. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1993); In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992); In re
Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 949 (J.P.M.L. 1979).
10. See, e.g., In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555
(D. Alaska Jan. 26, 1994).
11. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (involving successive race discrimina-
tion suits by groups of firefighters).
12. See Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation,
Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. Rav. 989, 1010-
12 (1995).
13. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th
Cir. 1996); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997) (vacating the asbestos settlement class action
approval in In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), and remanding it for recon-
sideration in light of Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997)).
[Vol. 96:945
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tion of dispersed litigation appear destined for failure, at least in the
near term.14
This article examines the problem of interjurisdictional preclu-
sion, and, in particular, the problem of choice of preclusion law.
Choice of-preclusion law cannot be appreciated in the abstract, but
rather must be considered in light of litigation realities. Thus, the
article considers the following series of questions: First, how does
preclusion law affect litigation behavior, and what policy implica-
tions result from these effects? Second, to what extent does preclu-
sion law actually vary among jurisdictions? Third, what is the legal
foundation for interjurisdictional preclusion, and what law ought to
govern interjurisdictional preclusive effect? Fourth, how are courts
in fact dealing with interjurisdictional preclusion, and what implica-
tions does that empirical information carry for choice of preclusion
law?
Part I of the article considers the effect of preclusion law on the
behavior of litigation participants and concludes that preclusion law
can affect many of the most significant strategic decisions in litiga-
14. The most ambitious recent proposal appeared in the ALI Complex Litigation Project,
an elegant and thorough presentation of a comprehensive system for aggregating multiparty,
multiforum actions. The ALI proposals would allow intersystem consolidation - that is,
consolidation involving transfer from state court to federal court, from federal court to state
court, or from one state to another. See COMPLEX LrIIATION: STATUToRY RECOmmENDA-
TION AND ANALYsis (1994). The project's ambitiousness, however, may prove to be its
downfall. Some of those most familiar with the problem have expressed skepticism that the
ALI proposals will become law. See Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex
Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REv. 977, 977 (1994) ("[T]he Complex Litigation Project
seems destined to represent a massive, engaging intellectual exercise rather than a pragmatic
blueprint that Congress will enact for the conduct of complex litigation."); William W
Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Fed-
eral Courts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1689, 1699 (1992) ("Congress . . .is not likely to enact [the
Complex Litigation Project proposals] in the foreseeable future.").
A more modest proposal, the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act (UTLA), would allow
consolidation of related cases pending in multiple state courts. One UTLA proponent has
suggested that the UTLA stands a better chance than the ALl Complex Litigation Project.
See Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALl Project with the
Uniform Transfer of Litigation Ac4 54 LA. L. REv. 897, 898 (1994). The Act has been
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, but to be-
come law it must be adopted by the individual states. It has been enacted in South Dakota
and is under consideration in Kansas, Nebraska, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Mark C.
Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical Advantages of
the State Forum over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 215,
268 & n.287 (1994).
In 1988, a bill introduced by Representative Kastenmeier would have eased federal juris-
diction over aggregated multiparty, multiforum litigation. See H.R. 4807, 100th Cong.
§§ 301-07 (1988). That part of the bill did not become law, nor did it succeed when modified
and reintroduced several years later. See H.R. 2450, 102d Cong. (1991); see also ComPLEX
LITIGATION: STATuTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSiS ch. 2, cmt.a, reporter's note 3
(1994) (discussing the Kastenmeier bill); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond
Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 9 (1987) (propos-
ing multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction).
February 1998]
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tion. Its impact on litigation behavior, however, is not felt primarily
at the forum of the subsequent action (F2), where the parties pres-
ent their arguments on claim preclusion or issue preclusion.
Rather, the impact is felt at the forum of the prior action (F1),
where the parties and other participants make decisions based in
part on their expectation of the preclusive effect a judgment will
have. Thus, preclusion law matters to Fl's policy choices concern-
ing judicial economy, settlement, lawsuit size, litigant zeal, and
other litigation-related values.
To determine whether and how choice of preclusion law matters,
Part II examines the extent to which preclusion law varies from one
jurisdiction to another. Preclusion rules vary much more than most
lawyers would suspect, and they vary in ways that implicate the
strategic incentives discussed in Part I.
Given the importance of preclusion-law variations to strategic
incentives at the initial forum, the choice of preclusion law must not
turn on where the subsequent suit is filed. Rather, as Part III
shows, interjurisdictional preclusion requires a "pure F1 referent"
and should nearly always be governed by F1's own preclusion law.
This applies not only to the state-state and state-federal configura-
tions, which are governed by the full faith and credit statute,15 but
also to the federal-state configuration.
Part IV moves from the normative to the empirical. What, in
fact, do courts do when presented with a potentially preclusive
judgment from another United States jurisdiction? Of course, they
acknowledge the judgment's binding effect. But whose law do they
use to determine the nature and extent of the judgment's effect?
The article presents the results of my study of several hundred
interjurisdictional preclusion cases, focusing on the federal-state
configuration. Most often state courts apply their own preclusion
law, rather than the law of the rendering jurisdiction. Generally,
this appears to be done reflexively, as decisions rarely offer any
analysis of choice of preclusion law.
In light of this finding, recommending a complex rule involving
a nuanced balancing of the interests of multiple jurisdictions ap-
pears futile. Moreover, given the significance of preclusion law's
effect on litigation behavior, litigation participants need to know at
the outset what preclusion law will ultimately govern, regardless of
where subsequent cases are brought. When it comes to choice of
15. The federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), requires state and
federal courts to give state judicial proceedings "the same full faith and credit" as those
proceedings would be given in the jurisdiction where they occurred.
[Vol. 96:945
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preclusion law, what the courts and litigation participants need is a
clear rule determinable at the time of the original action. The
preclusive effect of a judgment, with rare exceptions, should be gov-
erned by the preclusion law of the rendering jurisdiction.
I. PRECLUSION LAW'S EFFEcr ON LITIGATION BEHAVIOR
Litigation is not a purely rational activity, but that should not
stop us from considering the law's effect on rational actors. It is
true that litigators, litigants, and interested others sometimes act
based on fear, pride, anger, and a host of other emotions. More-
over, even if all participants always attempted to make rational de-
cisions, they often would fail to do so simply for lack of tactical
insight.16 Nevertheless, enough litigation participants behave ra-
tionally and intelligently to make it worthwhile to examine how
such participants would behave17 - in other words, to examine the
strategic significance of preclusion law.
16. Economists refer to this as the concept of bounded rationality. Even if a lawyer, liti-
gant, witness, or other participant seeks to act purely in her own self-interest, that participant
can see only so many steps into the future, only so many branches up the decision tree.
Rational decisionmaking is bounded by limits on cognitive ability and incomplete or imper-
fect information. See HERBERT A. SIMON, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in 2 MOD)ELS OF
BOUNDED RATIONALrTY 408, 410-11 (1982).
17. Litigators frequently make correct strategic decisions by careful preparation and cal-
culation. Moreover, litigators' intuition, experience, and collective wisdom can replace pure
deductive rationality as a means of rational decisionmaking. Renowned litigator John W.
Davis spoke of "a sixth sense" on which he relied when making trial decisions. See WILLIAM
H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LnFE OF JOHN W. DAvis 59 (1973). Louis Nizer
has written of waking in the middle of the night with a hunch that proved decisive at trial.
See Louis NIZER, My Ln IN COURT 54-56 (1961).
In chess - one of the better analogies for litigation strategy - intuition and experience
have proved powerful substitutes for pure calculation. Human chess champion Garry
Kasparov has competed ably against the powerful chess computer Deep Blue notwithstand-
ing Deep Blue's vastly superior intellectual brute force. In 1996, Kasparov defeated Deep
Blue four games to two, despite Deep Blue's ability to evaluate at least 100 million positions
per second. "If Kasparov's victory proves anything, it is the superiority of creative intuition
- the human talent for seeing remote possibilities before calculating all the steps toward
them." Joseph McLellan, Kasparov Tactics Outfox Computer's 'Brute Force',- Intuition Stran-
gles Calculation in Chess Match, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at A8. In their 1997 rematch,
with Deep Blue's brain power boosted to 200 million positions per second, the computer beat
Kasparov by a score of 31h-21h. See Bruce Weber, Swift and Slashing, Computer Topples
Kasparov, N.Y. TIMms, May 12, 1997, at Al; Robert D. McFadden, Inscrutable Computer,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 12, 1997, at Al. Again, commentators noted the strategic power of human
experience and intuition. As one physicist noted, "What is amazing is that the machine had
to be able to see more than 10 moves ahead and analyze millions of moves a second to match
the intuition (based on long experience) of a fallible person who could analyze maybe one or
two moves a second." Daniel Greenberger, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMms, May 13, 1997,
at A20. In the chess game of litigation, even when litigators lack the time, inclination, or
brain power to consider a strategy's logical implications 10 moves ahead, litigators can use
intuition, experience, and collective wisdom to reach rational strategic decisions on behalf of
their clients.
February 1998]
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First, where does preclusion law affect litigation behavior? At
F2, the impact of preclusion law on behavior is obvious but limited.
Preclusion law affects behavior at F2 inasmuch as the litigants there
may raise and argue the question of preclusion, and preclusion may
determine the outcome of the case. A party who believes that she
can benefit from claim or issue preclusion will make a motion to
that effect, and her opponent will attempt to fend off adverse pre-
clusion. Further, parties at F2 may try to tailor pleadings to maxi-
mize or minimize the chance of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.
But more significant than the effect of preclusion law on litiga-
tion behavior at F2 is its effect on litigation behavior at F1. In any
lawsuit in which there is a risk of further related litigation, the care-
ful litigator must take into account the preclusive effect a judgment
might have in such future litigation and must calculate accordingly.
Others have noted preclusion law's strategic significance,18 but no
one has given it the sustained attention required if we are to under-
stand interjurisdictional preclusion in light of the realities of litiga-
tion practice.
A. Zeal and Appeal
Preclusion law affects the vigor with which a party litigates.
Consider the position of any litigant who anticipates future related
litigation with persons who are not parties to the current lawsuit.
The rational litigant will expend resources on the lawsuit in propor-
tion to the stakes of the suit. The more that is at stake, the more
tenaciously the parties will fight. Traditionally, mutuality was re-
quired for issue preclusion, and it is still required in a number of
jurisdictions. 19 With a mutuality requirement, issue preclusion ap-
plies only between parties, or those in privity with parties, to the
initial lawsuit. Under such a regime, a rational litigant will consider
only the stakes between the current parties, either in the immediate
lawsuit or in foreseeable further lawsuits between the same parties.
By contrast, when nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed, a rational
litigant will consider the stakes not only between the current par-
ties, but also the stakes in foreseeable lawsuits with others. Thus,
wherever a litigant can foresee related litigation with nonparties,
18. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 767, 797; Stephen B. Burbank, Where's the Beef7
The Interjurisdictional Effects of New Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J.
87,100-01 (1996); Graham C. Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 Omo ST. L.J. 289,311-13
(1993). Some of the strategic concerns discussed below are also addressed in Howard M.
Erichson, Dealing with Issue Preclusion in Complex Cases, 148 N.J. L.J. 204 (1997).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 76-95.
[Vol. 96:945
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nonmutual issue preclusion produces incentives to invest greater re-
sources into winning in order to prevent adverse determinations
that may carry a damaging issue-preclusive effect in subsequent
suits.20 As one litigator puts it, "The lesson is clear - never lose
the prior case."'21
The burden of this incentive can be particularly dire for mass
tort defendants, but only if the applicable law allows offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion.22 If offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
is allowed, a mass tort defendant - or any defendant facing a large
number of lawsuits growing out of a single incident or related series
of incidents - correctly perceives the first trial as a "must win"
situation. If the defendant loses the first trial and the essential lia-
bility issues are decided in favor of the plaintiff, then the defendant
faces the significant risk that each future plaintiff will avail himself
of issue preclusion to establish liability, If, on the other hand, the
defendant wins the first trial by prevailing on the essential liability
issues, then in all likelihood no future plaintiff will be able to use
issue preclusion against the defendant, even if the defendant loses
the second trial. This is because offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion is generally disallowed when there have been inconsistent
judgments.23 Thus, a defendant must place enormous emphasis on
prevailing in the first case that goes to trial.24
20. See Charles R. Bruton & Joseph C. Crawford, Collateral Estoppel and Trial Strategy,
Lrrax., Summer 1981, at 30,30-32,50; Judith Resnik, 7iers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 971 (1984)
("T]he possible collateral use of a decision by nonparties inevitably 'ups the stake' of the
first action, thereby providing incentives for parties to invest heavily in the first round.").
This strategic incentive is not limited to the mutuality doctrine but applies to any rule that
expands preclusive effect. "[A]ny tendency to extend the conclusive effects of matters previ-
ously adjudicated might easily tend to intensify the effort expended in the initial litigation
and might increase the probability of resort to appeal .... " Alan N. Polasky, Collateral
Estoppel - Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217, 220 (1954).
21. Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 30.
22. "Offensive nonmutual issue preclusion refers to a new claimant's assertion of issue
preclusion to inflict liability against a defendant who previously lost on that issue, in
contrast to defensive issue preclusion, where a party asserts issue preclusion to shield
itself from liability to a claimant who previously lost on that issue."
Erichson, supra note 18, at 204.
23. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-32 (1979); State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, 550 P.2d 1185,1191 (Or. 1976); REsTATEMENT (SEc-
oND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(4) (listing inconsistent determinations as a circumstance that may
justify allowing relitigation of an issue). See generally Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collat-
eral EstoppeL Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957). The rule, how-
ever, is not absolute. See, ag., Batson v. Lederle Lab., 674 A.2d 1013, 1014-15 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1996) (applying issue preclusion despite differing prior determinations), cert.
granted 147 NJ. 261 (1996).
24. See Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 32 (observing that offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion makes it critical to the defendant to prevail in the first case, thus making the
question of which case gets tried first of utmost importance).
February 1998]
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Differences in the preclusive effect of alternative holdings pro-
vide another example of how preclusion law affects zealousness of
advocacy. Consider a case in which the court gives two or three
alternative factual explanations in support of the judgment, each
one sufficient to support the judgment. If the applicable preclusion
law holds that none of the alternative holdings is "essential to the
judgment" and entitled to issue-preclusive effect,25 then a party
with a strong case on one theory may not allocate much effort to
the other theories.26 If, on the other hand, each alternative holding
is considered "essential to the judgment" and entitled to issue-
preclusive effect, then a party concerned about future related law-
suits will litigate each theory to the hilt.27
Litigants may also decide whether or not to appeal adverse deci-
sions based on the governing law of issue preclusion. If nonmutual
preclusion is allowed, then parties anticipating related litigation
with nonparties will allocate greater resources to winning and thus
will more likely appeal from adverse determinations. Likewise, in
jurisdictions that grant issue-preclusive effect to each alternative
holding, parties may appeal adverse determinations even if they
know that reversal is impossible because of the other alternative
holdings.28
Decisions to appeal can flow even more directly from preclusion
law. In some jurisdictions, a judgment is not considered final for
purposes of claim preclusion and issue preclusion until after ap-
peal.29 Under this view of finality, a losing litigant afraid of a judg-
ment's potential preclusive effect, and looking to buy some time,
can attempt to forestall the judgment's preclusive effect by filing an
appeal.
B. Delay
Variations in preclusion law affect litigants' incentives to speed
up or slow down the pace of a lawsuit.3 0 This is particularly true
25. See infra text accompanying notes 103-05.
26. A plaintiff in such a jurisdiction should consider holding back all but the strongest
theory, if the plaintiff wishes to ensure that a later court will give the winning theory issue-
preclusive effect.
27. See Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 106 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1970).
28. See Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 453-54 (8th Cir. 1997); Halpern v.
Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1970).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 126-34.
30. Ethical and procedural rules limit the extent to which litigators may permissibly seek
to delay litigation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (allowing the court to impose costs and
fees on an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa-
tiously"); FED. R. Crv. P. 11(b)(1) (providing that by presenting a paper to the court, the
[Vol. 96:945
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when a single litigant is involved in multiple simultaneous lawsuits,
such as a mass tort defendant, a multi-infringed patent plaintiff, or a
party defending against parallel civil and criminal proceedings. The
first-tried case in such situations inevitably carries significant
weight, even without preclusion. In the mass tort context, for ex-
ample, the first jury verdict weighs heavily in subsequent settlement
negotiations between the defendant and remaining plaintiffs.
Where mutuality is not required for issue preclusion, however, the
result of the first-tried case takes on enormous strategic significance
far beyond its persuasive value in settlement talks. Because an ad-
verse determination may bind the party in all future lawsuits, a con-
cerned litigant will seek to use procedural machinations in order to
try a winner first. By delaying less favorable cases and expediting
more favorable cases, a party can try to maximize the chance of a
victory in the first trial.31
Consider also the position of a plaintiff in a civil action against a
defendant who faces criminal charges arising out of the same event
or transaction.32 Depending on the applicable law concerning the
preclusive effect of a criminal judgment in a subsequent civil suit,33
the plaintiff faces an incentive to delay his lawsuit in order to await
attorney certifies that "it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation"); MODEL RuLns
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.1 (1996) (prohibiting frivolous proceedings, assertions,
or controvertions); MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.2 (1996) ("A lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the cli-
ent."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'ESSIONAL REsPoNsiBLxrY DR 7-101(A)(1) (1982) (stating that
zealous advocacy is not violated "by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commit-
ments"). Perhaps the most explicit antidelay provision belongs to Texas: "In the course of
litigation, a lawyer shall not take a position that unreasonably increases the costs or other
burdens of the case or that unreasonably delays resolution of the matter." Tnx. R. CT. 3.02.
Nevertheless, there remains ample room for practitioners to retard or expedite the pro-
cess. Delay comes not only from ethically questionable stalling tactics and does not require
explicit adjournments. Delay comes, for example, from each nonfrivolous but nonessential
motion. It comes from full relevant discovery when partial discovery might suffice. Delay
comes from demanding a jury rather than bench trial, from forum-shopping for a crowded
docket, and any of a host of other litigation maneuvers. As California's attorney general
once put it, "An incompetent attorney can delay a trial for years or months. A competent
attorney can delay one even longer." Tim QUOTABLE LAWYER § 132.16 (David S. Shrager &
Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986) (quoting Evelle J. Younger).
31. See Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 32, 50.
32. The most prominent recent example of a defendant facing both criminal and civil
proceedings arising out of the same event is O.J. Simpson, who faced murder charges for the
death of his ex-wife and another and also faced a wrongful death and survivorship lawsuit
filed by the decedents' families. See Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC036876, 1997 WL 45143 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997) (civil); People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995) (criminal).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 106-17 (discussing the preclusive effect of guilty
pleas); see also infra text accompanying notes 76-95 (discussing nonmutual issue preclusion).
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a helpful outcome in the criminal proceeding.3 4 Similarly, in states
with a compulsory party joinder preclusion doctrine,35 a defendant
sued in one of multiple lawsuits by a single plaintiff may seek to
delay its case until a case against another defendant is triedA6
C. Joinder
Preclusion law's impact on joinder of claims and parties can be
direct and overwhelming. Before deciding what claims to assert in
a lawsuit, a party must know whether it will have another opportu-
nity to assert potential claims. This requires knowing the applicable
preclusion rules, and, in particular, the definition of a "claim" for
purposes of claim preclusion.
The broader the definition of "claim," the more that will be pre-
cluded in a subsequent action.3 7 The effect on joinder is clear. If a
narrow definition applies, a plaintiff can decide whether to assert
several "different claims" together or separately, based on any
number of strategic considerations. But if a broad definition ap-
plies, then a plaintiff may have no practical choice but to join the
claims in a single lawsuit.
A defendant considering a counterclaim faces a very similar sit-
uation. A compulsory counterclaim rule38 that later will preclude
34. See Jonathan C. Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Criminal Determina-
tions: Theoretica4 Practical and Strategic Implications for Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70
GEo. L.J. 1079, 1119-20 (1982) [hereinafter Thau, Collateral Estoppel]; Jonathan C. Thau,
How Lawyers Can Benefit from Trend in Collateral Estoppel, NATL. LJ., Nov. 7, 1983, at 22
[hereinafter Thau, Lawyers].
This strategic reasoning applies as well to a plaintiff suing a defendant who faces parallel
civil lawsuits by other plaintiffs. If offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed, each
plaintiff has an incentive to wait and see the result of the other plaintiffs' cases. If another
plaintiff loses, the defense verdict does not bind the waiting plaintiff, but if the other plaintiff
wins, then the waiting plaintiff can attempt to use noninutual issue preclusion against the
defendant. Courts have addressed this "wait and see" problem by holding that offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion is generally unavailable if the plaintiff easily could have joined in
the prior action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979); RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(3) (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 29(3) cmt. e (1982) ("A person in such a position that he might ordinarily have been ex-
pected to join as plaintiff in the first action, but who did not do so, may be refused the
benefits of 'offensive' issue preclusion where the circumstances suggest that he wished to
avail himself of the benefits of a favorable outcome without incurring the risk of an unfavora-
ble one.").
35. See infra text accompanying notes 181-202 (regarding the New Jersey entire contro-
versy doctrine and the Kansas one-action rule).
36. See James D. Griffin & Chris Reitz, A Review of the Kansas Comparative Fault Act,
KAN. B. ASSN. J. June-July 1994, at 26, 27-28 (asserting that under the one-action rule, when
there are multiple lawsuits, "[d]efendants will try to have their case delayed until the other
case is tried").
37. See infra text accompanying notes 135-41.
38. Sei infra text accompanying notes 160-77.
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the counterclaim gives the defendant a trumping reason to assert
the counterclaim, regardless of what tactical considerations might
otherwise have impelled the defendant to save the claim for an-
other day, another forum, or another lawsuit. If no compulsory
counterclaim rule or defense preclusion applies, then the counter-
claim will not be precluded later, and the defendant might well
choose not to assert the claim in the same lawsuit.39
Decisions concerning joinder of parties, too, can depend on pre-
clusion law. In most jurisdictions, failure to join a party has no
claim-preclusive effect. A plaintiff can sue one defendant now and
another defendant in a separate lawsuit later, unless that other de-
fendant was in privity with a party, based on a number of strategic
considerations.40 In two jurisdictions, however, the subsequent law-
39. As a matter of strategy or efficiency, the defendant nevertheless might assert the
counterclaim, perhaps on the theory that the best defense is a good offense. On the other
hand, if the defendant's affirmative claim is weighty, it may be wasted as a counterclaim. By
asserting the claim as a counterclaim rather than as a separate lawsuit, a defendant forfeits
the choice of forum and timing. A defendant also may be concerned that a judge or jury will
perceive the assertion as "merely a counterclaim" and will view it more as a tactical maneu-
ver than as a legitimate claim.
40. A plaintiff may prefer to join all potential defendants in a single lawsuit for many
reasons. Strategically, joinder may encourage divisive finger-pointing among the defendants.
Joinder of defendants often enhances litigational efficiency by allowing the plaintiff to focus
resources on a single lawsuit rather than several. Discovery rules make discovery easier to
obtain from parties than from nonparties, thus a potential defendant provides greater infor-
mational value as a joined defendant than as a nonparty. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (al-
lowing interrogatories only of parties).
On the other hand, strategy and other factors may lead a plaintiff to exactly the opposite
conclusion. A plaintiff may choose not to join an additional defendant with the expectation
that truthful, helpful testimony may be more forthcoming from a nonparty than from a party.
In a medical malpractice case, for example, a plaintiff's decision to sue only the doctors may
have been motivated by the hope
that, by not joining the hospital and auxiliary staff people, the plaintiff might obtain less
hostile testimony from the people at the hospital who were in a position to observe how
the doctors had handled the operation. That would have helped prove a case in a kind
of litigation where a claim is hard to prove, partly because a 'conspiracy of silence' often
enshrouds the doctors.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Examination Before and Behind the "Entire Controversy" Doc-
trine, 28 RTrronRs LJ. 7, 21 (1996). As Professor Hazard explains:
[T]he plaintiffs lawyer has to make a calculated judgment: Should I join all the poten-
tial defendants and hope at least one of them will point the finger? Or should I omit
some of them and hope that, being thus implicitly exonerated, they will tell what I think
is the truth?
Id. at 22.
Depending on circumstances, litigational efficiency may persuade a plaintiff either to join
or not to join additional defendants. Although joinder of multiple defendants in one lawsuit
often makes efficient sense, sometimes a plaintiff would rather seek relief in a simple action
against the primary defendant and sue others only in the event that adequate relief cannot be
obtained from that initial defendant. See Symposium, Circle Chevrolet: Pitfalls in Legal
Malpractice, 145 NJ. LJ. 1, 10 (1996) [hereinafter Circle Chevrolet Symposium] ("Forcing
litigants to join additional parties, when some of those claims otherwise would never be as-
serted, complicates and delays the underlying litigation by adding layers of unnecessary com-
plexity to discovery and other pretrial proceedings." (quoting Howard M. Erichson)).
February 1998]
HeinOnline  -- 96 Mich. L. Rev. 955 1997-1998
Michigan Law Review
suit may be claim precluded if the plaintiffs claims against the vari-
ous defendants form part of the same controversy, 41 and the
plaintiff faces a powerful incentive to join the additional defendants
in the initial proceeding. The same reasoning applies to a defend-
ant contemplating whether to implead a potential third-party de-
fendant, such as a joint tortfeasor, who may be liable for
contribution.
D. Settlement
Given that the majority of lawsuits are resolved by negotiated
settlement rather than by adjudication, settlement incentives and
disincentives deserve careful attention. They matter to the litigants,
because the outcome of a lawsuit generally turns on settlement.
They also matter to the courts because the courts could not main-
tain a manageable docket without a high settlement rate.
As with several other strategic issues, the critical aspect of pre-
clusion law here is mutuality of issue preclusion. If nonmutual pre-
clusion is allowed, parties are more likely to settle. Any litigant
concerned about future related litigation with other parties should
be willing to pay more - or accept less - in order to reach settle-
ment. As a matter of issue preclusion, a favorable judgment cannot
help the party in future litigation with others, because those others
are not bound by the judgment in the absence of privity. An
unfavorable judgment, however, can harm the party in future litiga-
tion with others, because if mutuality is not required, then others
can use the judgment to their advantage even though they were not
parties to the prior lawsuit. Thus, a litigant facing potential related
litigation with others attributes extra value to avoiding a
judgment.42
Finally, plaintiffs may prefer not to join an additional defendant for valuable reasons un-
related to tactics. Many potential claims go unasserted simply because the plaintiff chooses
not to fight that fight, especially if the potential defendant is someone with whom the plaintiff
has a valued relationship, and especially if the plaintiff can attempt to obtain adequate relief
from other defendants. See id. (observing that a client with a potential legal malpractice
claim may prefer to seek recovery from other defendants, rather than from the client's own
lawyer).
41. The jurisdictions are New Jersey, with its "entire controversy doctrine," and Kansas,
with its "one-action rule." See infra text accompanying notes 181-202.
42. In economic terms, the issue determination in the initial lawsuit can be viewed as a
public good for other litigants. A litigant in the initial lawsuit may be willing to pay money to
prevent the public good from being created. The major problem with public goods is that
each potential beneficiary of the good would prefer to be a free rider, waiting for someone
else to produce the good and then accepting the benefit without having accepted the concom-
itant cost or risk. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcrON: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GRouPs 14-16 (1965). This problem arises under preclusion law only if
nonmutual issue preclusion is permitted, and especially if offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
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This settlement incentive may affect the parties unequally,
changing the settlement dynamic and creating a more favorable set-
tlement for one of the parties, ordinarily the plaintiff. Consider, for
example, an alleged monopolist facing antitrust challenges from a
number of would-be competitors. If the law permits offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion, each early plaintiff gains a bargaining ad-
vantage over the defendant, because a judgment can hurt the
defendant more than it can help the plaintiff. A determination that
the defendant engaged in price fixing or unreasonable restraint of
trade may bind the defendant in subsequent antitrust suits, so the
defendant may be willing to sweeten the settlement pot in order to
avoid the risk of an adverse judgment. Similarly, a manufacturer
facing product liability claims by a number of plaintiffs may prefer
to pay additional money to avoid the risk of an issue-preclusive de-
termination of a product defect.43 If the first case to reach trial is
weak for the defendant - for example, if the plaintiff is especially
sympathetic or plaintiff's counsel especially well prepared - the
defendant will be even more inclined to settle, so that a stronger
defense case will be the first to reach judgment.44
Perhaps some lawyers take these strategic incentives too far. In
the first Prozac liability case to go to trial, the defendant, manu-
facturer Eli Lilly, reportedly paid twenty-eight plaintiffs for a secret
deal. According to news reports, the plaintiffs in return agreed not
sion is permitted. See Steven M. Crafton, Comment, Taking the Oakland Raiders: A Theo-
retical Reconsideration of the Concepts of Public Use and Just Compensation, 32 EMORY L.J.
857, 865 n.50 (1983).
The law of preclusion deals with this free riding by generally prohibiting the use of offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion when the plaintiff could have joined easily in the initial law-
suit. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979); R.STATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENIS § 29(3) (1982); REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt.
e (1982). If a private plaintiff prosecutes the first case, other potential plaintiffs generally can
benefit from the judgment only if they absorb part of the cost (especially attorneys' fees) and
risk (especially the risk of being bound by an unfavorable judgment). If the government
prosecutes the first case, however, private plaintiffs may benefit from the judgment via offen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion. For example, in Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331-32, a
private plaintiff was permitted to use offensive nonmutual issue preclusion to benefit from a
favorable judgment in an enforcement action brought against the defendant by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, because the plaintiff could not have joined in the SEC action. In
economic terms, the two scenarios provide a sensible response to the public good-free rider
problem. In order for a private plaintiff to benefit from the public good of a favorable judg-
ment on a particular issue, either the plaintiff must have absorbed its share of the cost and
risk by joining the action, or the public good must have been created by the government
funded with tax dollars.
43. Cf. Middleborough Horizontal Prop. Regime Council of Co-owners v. Montedison
S.p.A., 465 S.E.2d 765, 769 (S.C. App. 1995) (precluding a polyvinylchloride manufacturer
from relitigating a finding of product defect from an earlier plaintiff's products liability
action).
44. See Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 50.
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to introduce certain damaging evidence at trial and not to appeal.
The case resulted, as Eli Lilly had hoped, in a defense verdict.45
Such a deal, in my opinion, plainly violates ethical norms. What the
defendant hoped to purchase with its settlement dollars was both
the favorable press coverage of a defense verdict in order to dis-
courage future potential plaintiffs, and an elimination of the risk of
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. A defense judgment not only
avoids the damaging issue-preclusive effect of a liability determina-
tion; it also protects against issue preclusion in the future, because
even if the next plaintiff wins, that plaintiffs judgment probably will
not be given nonmutual effect in the face of a prior inconsistent
determination.
These incentives can apply to plaintiffs as well. A risk-averse
patent holder pursuing infringement actions against multiple
alleged infringers may prefer to settle each case rather than risk an
adverse judgment. A single determination that the holder's patent
is invalid may bind the plaintiff as a matter of defensive nonmutual
issue preclusion, thus guaranteeing the plaintiff's failure in subse-
quent actions.46
In criminal proceedings, preclusion law can affect plea negotia-
tions. If a guilty plea has issue-preclusive effect in parallel or subse-
quent civil litigation,47 then a defendant is less likely to plead guilty.
Conversely, if a guilty plea has no issue-preclusive effect but a con-
viction at trial does have issue-preclusive effect, 48 then a defendant
is more likely to plead guilty in order to avoid the damaging preclu-
sive impact of a trial conviction. This is particularly true in situa-
45. See Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449, 451-52 (Ky. 1996); Maureen Castellano,
The Secret Deal That Won the Prozac Case, 140 NJ. L.J. 377 (1995).
46. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). In some
cases, such as some complex commercial litigation, both the plaintiff and the defendant may
face potential related litigation with others. Examples would include major construction dis-
putes and litigation concerning corporate mergers and acquisitions. In such situations, the
availability of nomnutual issue preclusion encourages both the plaintiff and the defendant to
seek settlement. The defendant should be willing to pay more to avoid an adverse judgment,
and the plaintiff should be willing to accept less. Thus, the parties' true settlement positions
- that is, the range within which the parties genuinely would prefer to settle rather than to
proceed to trial - are more likely to overlap, and settlement is more likely to result. Over-
lapping settlement positions make settlement possible, but of course that is no guarantee that
settlement will result.
47. Guilty pleas carry issue-preclusive effect under federal law and the law of a minority
of states. See infra text accompanying notes 107-12.
48. Guilty pleas carry no issue-preclusive effect - although they nevertheless may be
admissible in evidence - under a majority of states' laws and according to the RasrArn-.
mENr (SEcoND) OF JuDGrmENs § 85 cmt. b (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 113-
17.
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tions in which the criminal penalties pale in comparison to the
potential civil liability.4 9
E. Other Litigation Decisions
Issue preclusion creates incentives for parties to support consoli-
dation,5 0 compulsory joinder,51 or class certification.5 2 Nonparties
cannot be bound by a judgment. When nonmutual issue preclusion
is permitted, however, nonparties can benefit from a judgment.
The best way to recreate mutuality of estoppel is to turn nonparties
into parties, by moving to consolidate with other lawsuits, by seek-
ing an order to join necessary parties, or by moving for or support-
ing class certification. Thus, a defendant facing numerous separate
lawsuits, contrary to traditional common wisdom,53 may favor class
action treatment.
Preclusion law also may affect the choice between a bench trial
and a jury trial, and between a general verdict and a special verdict.
In general, the easier it is to determine precisely what was decided,
the more likely it is that the decision will carry issue-preclusive ef-
fect. Thus, a party hoping to reduce the risk of issue preclusion in
subsequent litigation, all else being equal, will prefer a jury trial to a
bench trial and will prefer a general jury verdict to either a special
verdict or general verdict with interrogatories. 54
49. See Than, Collateral Estoppe; supra note 34, at 1095-98 (discussing criminal-civil issue
preclusion against "deep-pocket defendants").
Another effect of issue preclusion law is that a criminal defendant's decision whether to
plead guilty or to plead nolo contendere may depend upon which plea will have issue-preclu-
sive effect in subsequent civil litigation. See Thau, Lawyers, supra note 34. In some jurisdic-
tions, a guilty plea carries issue-preclusive effect, but a nolo plea does not. In general, a plea
of nolo contendere establishes guilt solely for the purpose of the present criminal proceeding
and carries no issue-preclusive effect. See FED. R. CIpm. P. 11(e)(6) (stating that evidence of
nolo contendere plea is not admissible against a defendant in any civil or criminal proceed-
ing); C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Plea of Nolo Contendre or Non Vult Contendre, 89
A.L.R.2D 540, 600 (1963). But see ARIz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-807 (West 1989) ("A defend-
ant convicted in a criminal proceeding is precluded from subsequently denying in any civil
proceeding the essential allegations of the criminal offense of which he was adjudged guilty,
including judgments of guilt resulting from no contest pleas."). A defendant facing both
criminal and civil liability thus prefers to plead nolo contendere in the criminal case, but the
government may find itself pressured by interested citizens - including potential civil plain-
tiffs - not to accept a nolo plea.
50. See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 42.
51. See generally FED. R. Crv. P. 19.
52. See generally FED. R. Cirv. P. 23.
53. See Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problem," 92 HArv. L. REv. 664, 679-80 (1979) (noting the history of the
defense bar's staunch opposition to class certification).
54. See Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 50.
February 1998]
HeinOnline  -- 96 Mich. L. Rev. 959 1997-1998
Michigan Law Review
F. Non-Party Participants
Not only does preclusion law affect the behavior of litigants and
litigators, it also affects the behavior of interested nonparties. For
example, a nonparty with an interest in a lawsuit may have a right
to intervene.5 5 If the nonparty does not intervene, then the judg-
ment cannot legally bind the nonparty.5 6 A nonparty hoping to use
a judgment for its issue-preclusive effect in subsequent litigation
may choose not to intervene, in order to have the benefit of using
nonmutual issue preclusion without the detriment of being legally
bound by the judgment.5 7 The nonparty's strategic position is very
different, however, if a nonparty is likely to be deemed in privity
with a party and therefore bound by the judgment. In that situa-
tion, the nonparty is more likely to intervene, because it may prefer
to have more direct control over the litigation. Thus, intervention
decisions can be guided both by the law concerning nonmutual
issue-preclusion and by the law concerning privity.
Closely related to notions of privity is the rule that a judgment
can bind a nonparty if the nonparty controls the litigation.5 8 Inter-
ested nonparties, who otherwise might be tempted to exert influ-
ence over the parties' litigation decisions, must temper their
involvement if they wish to avoid being bound by the judgment.
Interested nonparties thus are advised to maintain some distance
between themselves and the parties' strategic decisionmaking, and
to be wary of financing the litigation of others.59
Witnesses, too, face incentives based on preclusion law. Non-
mutual issue preclusion means that nonparty witnesses have reason
to cooperate - and perhaps to testify in a particular manner -
when they stand to benefit from the nonmutual issue-preclusive ef-
fect of a judgment. For example, if a defendant faces criminal
charges and also potential civil liability, a potential civil plaintiff has
a self-interest in testifying against the defendant in the criminal
trial. If the defendant is convicted, that conviction may benefit the
plaintiff through issue preclusion in the civil litigation.60 The same
incentive that may make a witness more inclined to testify against a
55. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
56. See Martin v. Wlks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
57. This strategy may be constrained, however, by the general rule disallowing offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion for plaintiffs who intentionally bypassed the prior action. See
supra note 34.
58. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
59. See Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 50.
60. See United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 158-61 (2d Cir. 1974); Thau, Collateral Es-
toppe supra note 34, at 1118 & n.214.
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defendant also may make that person more inclined to press
charges, to alert the government to the problem, or to pressure the
government to prosecute.6 1
G. Litigation Behavior and F1's Policies
We have examined the significance of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion to litigation behavior. What does this have to do with
interjurisdictional preclusion and choice of preclusion law? Preclu-
sion law's impact on litigation behavior should drive the analysis of
choice of preclusion law, because the most significant interests at
stake in choice of preclusion law are the litigation-related interests
of the initial forum. In cases in which the initial lawsuit occurs in
one jurisdiction (F1) and the subsequent suit occurs in another juris-
diction (F2), the more significant impact of preclusion law on litiga-
tion behavior is at Fl.
As we have seen, preclusion-sensitive decisions at F1 can include
joinder of claims, joinder of parties, resource allocation, appeals,
efforts to delay or expedite, settlement, guilty pleas, consolidation,
class certification, jury demands, intervention, nonparty involve-
ment in litigation control, and witness testimony. The strategic
choices made by participants at F1 matter not only to the litigants
and their lawyers, but to F1 itself. Preclusion law is based on policy
determinations and value choices, with the understanding and in-
tent that preclusion law will affect litigation behavior.62 Each juris-
diction's preclusion rules flow from the procedural opportunities
available in that jurisdiction as the F1 forum 63 and reflect the extent
to which that jurisdiction chooses to encourage litigants to avail
themselves of those procedural opportunities.
For example, the definition of claim for purposes of claim pre-
clusion determines the extent to which joinder is encouraged. By
defining claim broadly, a jurisdiction encourages joinder of related
61. For example, criminal and civil antitrust enforcement actions pursued by the Depart-
ment of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission sometimes are prompted by private entities
- potential antitrust plaintiffs - who are harmed by the defendant's alleged antitrust viola-
tions. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Defying the Juggernaut: Netscape Maneuvers for Position in a
Microsoft-Ruled World N.Y. Tmmus, Nov. 10, 1997, at D1 (noting that Netscape president
James Barksdale "has prodded Washington to take antitrust action against Microsoft").
62. Cf Resnik, supra note 20, at 981-82 (discussing "genuine value choices" made by the
U.S. Supreme Court in its preclusion decisions and suggesting that values rejected by the
Court include differentiation, diffusion of power, deliberate norm enforcement, additional
persuasion opportunities, and revisionism).
63. See REsTATEmENT (SEconn) OF JuDG~mErs introduction at 10 (1982) (discussing
"the relationship between rules of original procedure and rules of res judicata" and noting
that "when the rules of original procedure constrain the first opportunity to litigate, the rules
of res judicata are adjusted reciprocally").
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claims, with the goal of enhancing litigation efficiency. 64 The broad
transactional definition of claim applied by federal courts and many
state courts flows from the generosity of pleading and joinder avail-
able under the Federal Rules and similar state rules.65 A narrower
definition of claim may reflect a choice to emphasize party auton-
omy over judicial economy. Similar considerations apply to the de-
cision whether to make certain counterclaims compulsory: a
compulsory counterclaim rule implies a greater emphasis on effi-
ciency than on litigant autonomy.
Similarly, by extending claim preclusion to claims against non-
parties, a jurisdiction can encourage joinder of parties. The federal
courts and most state courts permit the joinder of related parties
but neither encourage nor discourage such joinder through preclu-
sion law.66 Other jurisdictions, however, strongly encourage party
joinder by precluding related claims against nonparties that could
have been raised in a prior suit. These states assert that their en-
forcement of mandatory party joinder through claim preclusion is
designed to enhance efficiency, fairness, and consistency.67 The ex-
perience of these jurisdictions bears out the assertion that preclu-
sion rules profoundly affect litigation decisions, 68 and the
sometimes heated controversy among lawyers 69 confirms the signif-
icance of preclusion rules to litigation-related policy.
64. See Hagee v. City of Evanston, 729 F.2d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1984) (asserting that claim
preclusion is intended to impel "parties to consolidate all closely related matters into one
suit"); Bronstein v. Kalcheim, 467 N.E.2d 979, 983 (I1. App. Ct. 1984) (asserting that "the
doctrine of res judicata serves to promote judicial economy by requiring parties to litigate, in
one case, all rights arising out of the same set of operative facts").
65. See R-TATEM N r (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS introduction at 9 (1982).
66. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20.
67. See, e.g., DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (NJ. 1995) ("The purposes of the
[entire controversy] doctrine are threefold: (1) the need for complete and final disposition
through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those
with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the
reduction of delay."); Eurich v. Alkire, 579 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Kan. 1978) (noting that the one-
action rule of the Kansas comparative negligence act "provides machinery for drawing all
possible parties into a lawsuit to fully and finally litigate all issues and liability arising out of a
single collision or occurrence").
68. See Griffin & Reitz, supra note 36, at 27-28 (discussing tactical considerations based
on the one-action rule and noting that when there are multiple lawsuits "[d]efendants will try
to have their case delayed until the other case is tried"); id. at 32 ("The best single piece of
advice to parties in a negligence action is to bring in all potentially responsible parties into
one lawsuit."); Editoria" l7me to Reconsider Circle Chevrolet, N.J. LAW., Nov. 4, 1996, at 6
("New suits filed since Circle Chevrolet [(applying the entire controversy doctrine to legal
malpractice)] bring in prior counsel so long as there is the smallest possibility of a finding oflegal malpractice. Simple cases involving two attorneys now become complex multi-party
litigation.").
69. See, e.g., Circle Chevrolet Symposium, supra note 40 (debating the wisdom, fairness,
and efficiency of the entire controversy doctrine as applied to legal malpractice cases); Edito-
riak Entire Controversy, 147 NJ. LJ. 406 (Jan. 27, 1997) ("The current dimension of the
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The decision as to whether to allow nonmutual issue preclusion
- and the further decision whether to allow offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion - raises serious questions concerning litigation
policy at F1. Some attribute the decline of the mutuality rule to
expanded opportunities to join multiple parties in a single lawsuit.70
By allowing nonmutual preclusion, a jurisdiction encourages parties
to take advantage of those opportunities to bring additional parties
into the lawsuit. 71 Reasonable policymakers may differ as to
whether such party joinder helps judicial economy, by avoiding
multiple related lawsuits or multiple litigation of a single issue, or
hurts judicial economy, by making each lawsuit more complex.
As a last illustration of the F1 policy choices inherent in preclu-
sion rules, a jurisdiction's choice concerning finality pending appeal
reflects that jurisdiction's balancing of the value of reliability (not
basing preclusion on judgments that may yet be reversed) against
the value of efficiency (not encouraging excessive appeals). In sum,
although preclusion questions are fought out at the time of a subse-
quent lawsuit, the law of claim preclusion and issue preclusion re-
flects procedural policies that matter to the jurisdiction in which the
initial action takes place.
II. PRECLUSION LAW DIVERGENCES
Having explored the policy significance of preclusion law's ef-
fect on litigation behavior, we turn to differences in preclusion law
among U.S. jurisdictions. Despite preclusion law's policy signifi-
cance, choice of preclusion law matters only if preclusion law varies
from one jurisdiction to another. Which it does. In fact, preclusion
law varies much more than most lawyers would suspect. Moreover,
it varies in ways that trigger the strategic considerations discussed in
Part I.
entire controversy doctrine is an unmitigated abomination.... If the bar has a common
prayer, it is that the bane and affliction of the [current] version of the entire controversy be
lifted .... ).
70. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoNDr) OF JutnGmENrs introduction at 8 (1982).
71. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979) ("[D]efensive collat-
eral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first
action if possible.... [If offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed], the plaintiff has
every incentive to adopt a 'walt and see' attitude, in the hope that the first action by another
plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment.... Thus offensive use of collateral estoppel will
likely increase rather than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs
will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action." (cita-
tions omitted)); see also Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Iowa 1981)
(quoting Parklane Hosiery).
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A. Preclusion Law Commonalities
Many lawyers and judges assume that res judicata is what it is
and that there is little difference from one jurisdiction to another.72
As to much of preclusion law, they are correct. The essential ele-
ments of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion look similar
across jurisdictions. Claim preclusion in all fifty states as well as in
the federal courts can be summed up reasonably well as follows: a
valid, final judgment on the merits precludes relitigation of the
same claim between the same parties or their privies. 73 Similarly,
the following description of issue preclusion works reasonably well,
as far as it goes, for all United States jurisdictions: "[w]hen an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment,
the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the
parties." 74 In interjurisdictional preclusion cases, courts occasion-
ally point out that the result would be the same under the preclu-
sion law of F1 or F2.75
72. Cf REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 cmt. a (1982) ("[Prior to adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,] there was little difference in the doctrine of resjudicata as expounded in state and federal courts. Indeed, that is still true, so that it is still
usually a moot question whether the effect of a federal judgment is determined by federal law
or state law.").
73. See, e.g., REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF JuDGMENTS §§ 18, 19 (1982).
74. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
75. See, e.g., Wright v. Chicago Mun. Employees Credit Union, 639 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (federal-Illinois); Billiot v. LeBoeuf Bros. Towing Co., 640 So. 2d 826, 828(La. Ct. App. 1994) (federal-Louisiana); Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 N.W.2d829, 835 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (Kentucky-Michigan); Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 906S.W.2d 92, 101 n.7 (Tex. App. 1995) (federal-Texas); Kuhlman v. Thomas, 897 P.2d 365, 368
n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (federal-Washington).
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, published by the American Law Institute in1982, can be credited with enhancing uniformity of preclusion law. In "restating" the law ofpreclusion, the Second Restatement set forth a coherent vision of claim preclusion and issuepreclusion, widely followed by courts around the country. "It is difficult to overstate its influ-
ence." GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 106(B)(1) (1994). "Even in draft form, the work's treatment of the law of res judicatashaped many judicial decisions .... Some of its provisions are more controversial than others,yet there is no question that it is the most authoritative and influential writing on resjudcata
in the legal literature." Id.
It is tempting to say that certain "leading cases" also have contributed to the uniformity
of preclusion law, because those cases have been widely followed. The great cases ofBernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942) (Traynor, J.) (allowing nonmutualissue preclusion), Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971) (same), and Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (allowing offensivenonmutual issue preclusion), come especially to mind. Although many courts have indeed
followed these cases, it would be incorrect to credit these cases with creating uniformity. Infact, they have done exactly the opposite. What made these cases significant was their rejec-tion of traditionally accepted preclusion doctrine; their success is reflected in their holdingshaving become the majority view. Far from creating uniformity, these cases took what wasuniform - the strict mutuality requirement - and replaced it with either permanent or
[Vol. 96:945
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It is not in the basic definition of claim preclusion and issue pre-
clusion where jurisdictions differ. It is rather in the details. How is"same claim" defined? Who can assert issue preclusion? What
constitutes a final judgment? What are the bounds of privity?
When is a judgment "on the merits"? When is a determination es-
sential to the judgment? In the law of preclusion, the details are
many, and they matter.
B. Preclusion Law Divergences
1. Mutuality
The most important split in preclusion law concerns mutuality.
Mutuality traditionally was required for the assertion of issue pre-
clusion.76 In other words, a litigant could not assert issue preclusion
from a judgment unless she was bound by the same judgment -
that is, unless she was a party or in privity with a party to the initial
action. Under the traditional rule, issue preclusion applied only
when the parties to the subsequent lawsuit were the same as the
parties to the prior lawsuit.
In 1942, Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court
wrote the opinion in Bernhard v. Bank of America77 that rejected
the mutuality requirement under California preclusion law. Nearly
thirty years later, the United States Supreme Court followed suit,
rejecting mutuality as a matter of federal law in Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation.78  Following
Bernhard and Blonder-Tongue, most of the states rejected the strict
mutuality requirement for issue preclusion.79 Most, but not all.
transitional disaccord. Ihat, of course, is the price of common law development in a multiju-
risdictional system.
76. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912); RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) ("[A] person who is not a party...
is not bound by or entitled to claim the benefits of an adjudication .....
77. 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
78. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
79. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Mutuality of Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of
Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3D 1044 (1970 & 1996
Supp.) (citing cases); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGmEtrs § 29 reporter's note (1982)
(same).
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A number of states cling to the traditional mutuality require-
ment. Alabama, 0 Florida,81 Georgia,82 Kansas,8 3 Mississippi,84
North Dakota,85 and Virginia 86 require mutuality. Louisiana, which
only recently adopted the doctrine of issue preclusion, appears to
80. See Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala. 1994) ("Although many courts, includ-ing the Federal courts, have dispensed with the mutuality requirement, it remains the law in
Alabama.").
81. See Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 1995) ("[W]e are unwilling to
follow the lead of cerfain other states and of the federal courts in abandoning the require-
ments of mutuality in the application of collateral estoppel."); Jones v. Upjohn Co., 661 So.
2d 356, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (denying defensive nonmutual issue preclusion in a
criminal-civil configuration); Newport Div., Tenneco Chems., Inc. v. Thompson, 330 So. 2d
826, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (declining to abandon the mutuality requirement). But see
Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989) (allowing defensive nonmutual issue preclusion
in a criminal-civil configuration).
82. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-40 (1993); Farred v. Hicks, 915 F.2d 1530, 1533-34 (11th
Cir. 1990) (applying Georgia law to require mutuality); Gilmer v. Porterfield, 212 S.E.2d 842,
843 (Ga. 1975); see also StiltJes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 399 S.E.2d 708, 709 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1990) ("[Ildentity of parties or their privies is required in order to act as bar to second
lawsuit [under collateral estoppel doctrine]."), affdL, 409 S.E.2d 847 (Ga. 1991).
83. See McDermott v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Co., 712 P.2d 1199, 1208-09 (Kan. 1986) (re-
jecting the offensive use of nomiutual issue preclusion); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins.
Agency, 498 P.2d 265,273 (Kan. 1972) (rejecting the defensive use of nonmutual issue preclu-
sion and stating that "a litigant may invoke the bar of the prior judgment only if he wouldhave been bound by it had it gone the other way"); see also Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP,
Inc., 584 A.2d 1214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991) (applying Kansas preclusion law to require mutual-
ity). But see Crutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. Kan. 1976) (applying Kansas law to
allow defensive nonmutual issue preclusion and stating that Kansas had rejected only offen-
sive use of nonmutual issue preclusion).
84. See Hurst v. Metro Ford Sales & Service, Inc., No. 3:95CV55-B-A, 1996 WL 671384,
at *2-3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 1996) (applying Mississippi law to require strict mutuality);Walker v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 793 F. Supp. 688, 695-96 (N.D. Miss. 1992) (same);
McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335, 338 (S.D. Miss. 1980) (same);
Magee v. Griffin, 345 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Miss. 1977) (same).
85. See Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 384 (N.D. 1992);
Armstrong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282, 287-88 (N.D. 1972).
86. See Angstadt v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.E.2d 86, 87 (Va. 1995) ("For collateralestoppel to apply ... the parties to the prior and subsequent proceedings, or their privies,
must be the same .... [T1here... must be 'mutuality' .... "); Dual & Assocs., Inc. v. Wells,
403 S.E.2d 354, 356 (Va. 1991) (rejecting the defensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion);
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (Va. 1987) ("As recently as 1980, thisCourt made a considered, unanimous decision to resist the so-called 'modem trend' and not
to abrogate the mutuality requirement... We perceive no error [in this decision]."); Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217,219 (Va. 1980) ("In Virginia, the estab-lished rule is that collateral estoppel requires mutuality... especially when the estoppel is
used 'offensively."').
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require mutuality as well. 87 Ohio provides a limited public policy
exception but generally adheres to the mutuality requirement.88
The states that require mutuality are fully aware that they are in
the minority; their decision to retain the requirement is deliberate.
The Virginia Supreme Court, for example, asserted that "this Court
made a considered, unanimous decision to resist the so-called 'mod-
em trend' and not to abrogate the mutuality requirement."89 Simi-
larly, the Florida Supreme Court stated in 1995, "[W]e are unwilling
to follow the lead of certain other states and of the federal courts in
abandoning the requirements of mutuality in the application of col-
lateral estoppel." 90
Among the jurisdictions that have abandoned the traditional
mutuality requirement, most not only allow defensive nonmutual
issue preclusion, but under certain circumstances allow offensive as
well, 91 following the lead of the United States Supreme Court in
87. Louisiana adopted issue preclusion in 1991 by statute. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:4231 (West 1991). Prior to that, Louisiana rejected any use of issue preclusion, whether
mutual or nonmutual. See LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231 cmt. b (stating that this statute
changed the law by formally adopting issue preclusion); Oliver v. Department of Pub. Safety
& Corrections, 669 So. 2d 570,572 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "issue preclusion [was] a
principle heretofore rejected by our civilian system"). The language of the new issue preclu-
sion statute appears to require mutuality, but it remains to be seen how Louisiana courts will
treat the statute. Few cases filed since the statute's effective date of January 1, 1991, have
made their way into published Louisiana decisions, and none of them have presented the
issue of nonmutual issue preclusion. For further discussion of preclusion in Louisiana, see
infra text accompanying notes 119-24.
88. See Cashelmara Villas Ltd. Partnership v. DiBenedetto, 623 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993) ("Inherent in the concept of collateral estoppel is the requirement of mutual-
ity of parties. However, the requirement is waivable 'upon the basis of serving justice within
the framework of sound public policy."' (citation omitted)); Goodson v. McDonough Power
Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 982-84 (Ohio 1983) (emphasizing the limited nature of the pub-
lic policy exception to the mutuality requirement); cf. McAdoo v. Dallas Corp., 932 F.2d 522,
524-25 (6th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging Ohio's rejection of offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion but concluding that Ohio courts would allow defensive nonmutual issue preclusion
under certain circumstances).
89. Selected Risks, 355 S.E.2d at 581.
90. Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 1995).
91. See supra note 22 (defining offensive and defensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
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Parklane Hosiery v. Shore.92 Michigan 93 and Tennessee,94 however,
have chosen to allow defensive but not offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion. Illinois allows offensive nonmutual issue preclusion, but
apparently under more limited circumstances than allowed under
federal preclusion law.95
Cases involving nonmutual preclusion illustrate the importance
of choice of preclusion law. The mutuality split mattered, for exam-
ple, in Columbia Casualty Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc.96 A woman died
from toxic shock syndrome in 1983, and her widower sued Playtex
in federal court in Kansas.97 The jury awarded compensatory and
punitive damages based on its finding that by 1983 Playtex knew or
should have known of the risks of its super-absorbent tampons. 98
Playtex then sued its liability insurer in Delaware state court, seek-
ing reimbursement. The insurer, arguing that the policy should be
rescinded because Playtex fraudulently misrepresented the risk
associated with its tampons when it obtained coverage in 1984,
92. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
93. Compare Knoblauch v. Kenyon, 415 N.W.2d 286,290 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing
defensive nonmutual issue preclusion) and Braxton v. Litchalk, 223 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1974) (same) with Warda v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 533,537-38 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Where
a party attempts offensive use of a previously litigated issue, Michigan law will give preclusive
effect to the prior determination only between those who were parties or their privies to the
previous suit."). The law in Michigan concerning mutuality is rather cloudy, however, and a
strand of Michigan cases appears to cling to the traditional mutuality rule, especially in cases
involving the preclusive effect of agency determinations. See Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 96
F.3d 813, 820-21 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying Michigan law to require mutuality for the issue-
preclusive effect of an agency determination), vacated on other grounds, 106 F.3d 146 (6th
Cir. 1997) (en banc); Nummer v. Treasury Dept., 533 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Mich. 1995) (requir-
ing mutuality for issue preclusion based on an agency determination); Couch v. Schultz, 439
N.W.2d 296, 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that mutuality is "a necessary element of
collateral estoppel" in a case involving the effect of an agency determination); see also Lichon
v. American Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288,298 & n.16 (Mich. 1990) (requiring mutual-
ity but noting certain exceptions); Alterman v. Provizer, 491 N.W.2d 868, 869-70 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (applying an exception to the mutuality rule); Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66
U.S.L.W. 4060, 4068 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Nummer and
Lichon as requiring mutuality under Michigan law).
94. See Beaman Bottling Co. v. Bennett, No. 03A01-9103-CV-00091, 1991 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 843, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1991) ("While Tennessee courts have relaxed the
mutuality requirement in cases involving defensive collateral estoppel, they have not yet
adopted the federal practice of allowing offensive collateral estoppel."); Carroll v. Tunes
Printing Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1210,1212 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) ("While the Restate-
ment of Judgments, § 29, sanctions both offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel by
parties not involved in the previous determination, this jurisdiction has uniformly refused to
permit offensive application of the doctrine.").
95. See Herzog v. Lexington Township, 657 N.E.2d 926, 930 (IMl. 1995) (strongly caution-
ing against allowing offensive nonmutual issue preclusion and declining to permit it under the
circumstances); Van Milligan v. Board of Fire & Police Commrs., 630 N.E.2d 830, 835-36 (Ill.
1994) (same); In re Owens, 532 N.E.2d 248, 251-52 (Ill. 1988) (same).
96. 584 A.2d 1214 (Del. 1991).
97. See 584 A.2d at 1215-16.
98. See 584 A.2d at 1216.
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asserted that the prior jury determination precluded Playtex from
relitigating the issue of Playtex's knowledge of the risk.99 Because
the insurer was not a party to the Kansas federal action, it sought to
use nonmutual issue preclusion. Both Delaware and federal law
permitted nonmutual preclusion, but Kansas law required mutual-
ity. The Delaware court chose to apply Kansas preclusion law and
thus rejected the use of nonmutual issue preclusion. 100 Had it ap-
plied its own law, as many courts would have done,101 or federal
law, as I argue it should have done,1° 2 the court could have given
nonmutual issue-preclusive effect to the Kansas federal court's
decision.
2. Alternative Holdings
Issue preclusion only applies to issues that are "essential to the
judgment."103 If a court offers alternative holdings to explain the
result in a particular case, is each alternative holding essential to the
judgment and thus entitled to issue-preclusive effect in subsequent
cases? Many, and perhaps most, federal courts give issue-preclu-
sive effect to each alternative ground.1°4 Other courts and the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, however, take the view that
each alternative holding is not essential to the judgment and there-
fore generally not entitled to issue-preclusive effect.1 05
99. See 584 A.2d at 1216.
100. See 584 A.2d at 1217-19.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 316-31.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 301-15, 340-49.
103. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
104. See, e.g., Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. La Republica Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th
Cir. 1987); In re Westgate-Calif. Corp., 642 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1981); Winters v.
Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1978); Sheldon Co. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust v. Smith,
858 F. Supp. 663, 669-70 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Clarke v. Carlucci, 834 F. Supp. 636, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd., 29 F.3d 622 (2d Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Continental Cas. Co., 796 F. Supp.
1344, 1348 (D. Or. 1991). The First Restatement espoused this view. See RESTATEMENT
(FosT) OF JUDGME S § 68 cmt. n (1942). On the continuing vitality of this position in
federal decisions despite the Second Restatement's contrary view, see General Dynamics
Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1274, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("The majority
view is that all alternative, independent grounds upon which a court may base its decision
should be regarded as necessary for purposes of collateral estoppel."); Glictronix Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 603 F. Supp. 552, 566 (D.N.J. 1984) ("The clear majority view is
that a judgment is conclusive as to all issues that support all independent grounds on which
the judgment may be based."); 18 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGirr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrnc AND
PROCEDURE § 4421, at n.20 (1981 & Supp. 1997).
105. See, e.g., Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 453-54 (8th Cir. 1997); Lisa Lee
Mines v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 86 F.3d 1358, 1363 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 763 (1997); Baker Elec. Coop. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d
1466, 1475-76 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying North Dakota law); Arab African Intl. Bank v.
Epstein, 958 F.2d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying New Jersey law), revd. on other grounds,
10 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1993); Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 993 (4th Cir.
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3. Guilty Pleas
A criminal conviction can carry issue-preclusive effect in a sub-
sequent civil case. But what if the conviction was based on a guilty
plea, rather than trial and verdict? The issue can arise in an inten-
tional tort personal injury or wrongful death suit following a de-
fendant's plea of guilty to assault or homicide. It also can arise in a
civil fraud suit following a criminal fraud guilty plea. But it arises
most often in insurance coverage litigation; an insurer denies cover-
age based on a "criminal act" or "intentional act" exclusionary
clause in the insurance policy, and the insurer asserts that a guilty
plea already has conclusively established the criminal act.10 6
In the federal courts, guilty pleas carry issue-preclusive effect.10 7
A number of states agree, including Colorado, 0 8 Iowa,10 9
Michigan," 0 New York,"' and Oregon." 2 Other states, however,
follow the Second Restatement"3 in refusing to give issue-preclusive
effect to a guilty plea, reasoning that issue preclusion applies only
to issues that have been actually litigated. These include Califor-
1987); Marathon Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 938 F. Supp. 575, 579 & n.9 (D. Alaska 1996); Vanover v.
Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 438 N.W.2d 524, 526 (N.D. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
JuDGENTs § 27 cnt. i (1982).
106. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1997); Ideal
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wmker, 319 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1982); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 481
N.E.2d 1356 (Mass. 1985); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 914 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App.),
review denied, 920 P.2d 551 (Or. 1996).
107. See Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 384; Gray v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243, 246 (6th Cir.
1983); Fontneau v. United States, 654 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Bejar-
Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1980).
108. See Colorado Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 909, 911 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1997).
109. See Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Winker, 319 N.W.2d 289, 291-96 (Iowa 1982).
110. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 466 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990).
111. See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 1984); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 595 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1007-09 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
112. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 914 P.2d 697, 700 (Or. Ct. App.), review
denied, 920 P.2d 551 (Or. 1996).
113. RESrATFMNT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. b (1982) (noting that issue pre-
clusion "does not apply where the criminal judgment was based on a plea of nolo contendere
or a plea of guilty"). But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 379 (5th
Cir. 1997) (noting that the Second Restatement explicitly leaves open the possibility of "evi-
dentiary estoppel" to prevent defendant from later contesting elements underlying guilty
plea).
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nia,114 Massachusetts,115 New Jersey, 116 and many others.1 17 Be-
cause this divergence pits federal preclusion law against much state
law and the Second Restatement,11 8 it is particularly ripe for federal-
state interjurisdictional preclusion problems.
4. Louisiana
Louisiana historically took an exceedingly narrow view of claim
preclusion and simply did not recognize issue preclusion. In keep-
ing with its Napoleonic civil law tradition, Louisiana's codified
"civilian res judicata" provided for claim preclusion only when the
plaintiff sought the same relief and asserted the same cause of ac-
tion.119 In other words, a plaintiff could not reassert the very same
lawsuit, but otherwise claim preclusion and issue preclusion were
essentially nonexistent. Naturally, interjurisdictional cases arose in
which the outcome depended on choice of preclusion law. 20
In 1991, a new statute went into effect in Louisiana that substan-
tially broadens Louisiana's doctrine of claim preclusion and estab-
lishes the doctrine of issue preclusion in that state for the first time.
The statute establishes a transactional test for claim preclusion,
along the lines of federal law and the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments.12 1 As to issue preclusion, the statute provides that: "A judg-
ment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive,
in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue
actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential
to that judgment." 122 Because issue preclusion is so new in Louisi-
ana, 23 it is difficult to predict whether it will develop along the lines
114. See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439, 441 (Cal. 1962).
115. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1362-64 (Mass. 1985).
116. See Eaton v. Eaton, 575 A.2d 858 (NJ. 1990); Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Kollar, 578 A.2d 1238 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
117. See Niziolek, 481 N.E.2d at 1363 n.6 (citing cases from 39 states holding that guilty
pleas, while admissible in evidence, are not conclusive as a matter of issue preclusion).
118. See Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 378, 381 (noting that case law from other jurisdictions "is
divided roughly evenly on the question" and that "nothing approaching a consensus has
emerged").
119. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287, 289-90 (La. 1976); Fitch v. Vintage
Petroleum, Inc., 608 So. 2d 286, 288-89 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
120. See, e.g., Williams v. Divittoria, 760 F. Supp. 564, 566-67 (E.D. La. 1991) (applying
pre-1991 Louisiana law to reject claim preclusion and issue preclusion); Pili6 & Pili6 v. Metz,
547 So. 2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1989) (applying federal law to preclude).
121. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(1)-(2) (West 1991); infra text accompanying
notes 135-37.
122. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(3).
123. The statute applies only to cases filed after January 1, 1991. See 1990 La. Acts 521,
§ 5; Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hosp., 634 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. 1994). Only a handful of issue
preclusion cases invoking the statute have made their way into reported decisions. See, e.g.,
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of federal preclusion law and the Second Restatement or will de-
velop with Napoleonic idiosyncrasies. The early cases under the
new statute suggest that some Louisiana judges may be reluctant to
use their new preclusion tools.12 4 On the question of mutuality, the
statutory language - "in any subsequent action between them"1 5
- appears to require strict mutuality for issue preclusion, but that
too remains to be seen.
5. Finality
Finally, both issue preclusion and claim preclusion require that
the initial action have resulted in a final judgment.126 How final is
final, however, is a point of disagreement. Federal preclusion law
provides that judgments are final pending appeal.127 The Second
Restatement agrees with the federal position that judgments are en-
titled to claim-preclusive and issue-preclusive effect upon entry of
the judgment, regardless of whether the time to appeal has run, and
even if an appeal is pending.'2 Several states, however, disagree.
First Natl. Bank v. Smith, 691 So. 2d 355, 357-58 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Goodman v. Spillers,
686 So. 2d 160,166-67 (La. Ct. App. 1996), writ denied, 692 So. 2d 393 (La. 1997), writ denied,
692 So. 2d 400 (La. 1997); Oliver v. Department of Pub. Safety and Corrections, 669 So. 2d
570, 572 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 674 So. 2d 262 (La. 1996). None of the cases has raised
the question of nonmutual issue preclusion.
124. In Brouillard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 657 So. 2d 231, 232-33 (La. Ct. App.
1995), the court relied on a statutory "exceptional circumstances" exception to deny claim
preclusion in a second suit by an injured party against the premises insurer. The court ex-
plained, "The doctrine of res judicata is interpreted stricti juris, and any doubt regarding
compliance with its requirements is to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff." 657 So. 2d at 233;
see also Jenkins v. Louisiana, 615 So. 2d 405, 406-07 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (relying on the
exceptional circumstances exception to deny claim preclusion, over a persuasive dissent that
no exceptional circumstances were presented). Another Louisiana court apparently was not
even aware of the new statute adopting issue preclusion. In a case filed after the statute's
effective date, the court held that collateral estoppel cannot apply because "Louisiana law,
for whatever reason, has steadfastly refused to accept that doctrine." Diez v. Daigle, 686 So.
2d 966, 969 (La. Ct. App. 1996); see also Spillers, 686 So. 2d at 167 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(declining to apply issue preclusion on the facts presented and stating that "[t]he doctrine of
res judicata cannot be invoked unless all essential elements are present and established beyond
all question").
125. LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(3) (emphasis added).
126. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 & cmt. k (1982); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGmENTS § 13 (1982).
127. See Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Under
well-settled federal law, the pendency of an appeal does not diminish the res judicata effect of
a judgment rendered by a federal court."); see also Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199 (1932)
("[W]here a judgment in one case has successfully been made the basis for a judgment in a
second case, the second judgment will stand as res Judicata, although the first judgment be
subsequently reversed.").
128. See REsrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF JUDmENTs § 13 cmt. f (1982) ("The better view is
that a judgment otherwise final remains so despite the taking of an appeal unless what is
called an appeal actually consists of a trial de novo.").
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In California, 29 Georgia, 30 Oklahoma,131 Tennessee,132 Utah,133
and Washington,134 a judgment is not final for purposes of preclu-
sion until either resolution of the appeal or expiration of the time
for appeal. Thus, if a judgment has been appealed, it will have
preclusive effect under the law of certain jurisdictions but not under
the law of other jurisdictions.
6. Same Claim
The essential tenet of claim preclusion is that one cannot litigate
the same claim twice. But what does "same claim" mean? Courts
have developed various tests for determining whether the claim a
litigant seeks to assert in the second lawsuit is the same as the claim
asserted in the initial lawsuit.
The modem trend, supported by the Second Restatemen4 is to
apply a broad transactional test: a claim is precluded by a prior
judgment if the actions arise out of the same underlying transaction
or series of transactions. 35 The federal courts136 and many state
courts' 37 apply transactional tests along these lines.
129. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1049 (West 1980) (providing that "[ain action is
deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon
appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied");
Kuykendall v. State Bd. of Equalization, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783,789 (Ct. App. 1994); Sandoval
v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. Rptr. 29,32 (Ct. App. 1983) ("California law is settled that pend-
ing appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect.").
130. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-19 (1993); Reid v. Reid, 411 S.E.2d 754, 756 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1991); Lexington Developers, Inc. v. O'Neal Constr. Co., 238 S.E.2d 770, 771 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1977) ("In Georgia a judgment is suspended when an appeal is entered within the time
allowed. And the judgment is not final as long as there is a right to appellate review." (cita-
tions omitted)).
131. See Grider v. USX Corp., 847 P.2d 779, 784 n.1 (Okla. 1993) ("[A]n order is not
'final' ... for resjudicata purposes, if a timely appeal of its correctness still pends."); Benham
v. Plotner, 795 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1990).
132. See McBurney v. Aldrich, 816 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ("It is generally
agreed that a judgment is not final and res judicata where an appeal is pending.").
133. See Chavez v. Morris, 566 F. Supp. 359, 360 (D. Utah 1983); Young v. Hansen, 218
P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1950) ("[A] judgment is not final pending appeal and hence not admissi-
ble as a bar to another action."). But see Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227,230-
31 (Utah 1992) (recognizing a split concerning finality pending appeal but declining to decide
the issue because it was unnecessary to the court's holding).
134. See Chau v. City of Seattle, 802 P.2d 822, 825 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) ("Normally,
finality [for purposes of issue preclusion] is conclusively established by a judgment on the
merits either by affirmation on appeal, or by expiration of the time to appeal.").
135. See RESTATEMENT (SncoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
136. See, e.g., Apparel Art Intl., Inc. v. Amertex Enters. Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir.
1995); Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736,740 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Energy Coop. Inc., 814 F.2d
1226, 1230-31 (7th Cir. 1987).
137. See, e.g., Aldape v. Akins, 668 P.2d 130, 134-35 (Idaho CL App. 1983); Beegan v.
Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642, 644-46 (Me. 1982).
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Some state courts, however, have not adopted the broad defini-
tion of a claim urged by the Second Restatement. Using various
phrasings, these courts have required a more particular connection
between the current claim and the prior claim than the connection
that the claims arose out of the same underlying factual circum-
stances. Some look to whether the "same evidence" would suffice
to prove the prior and current claims.138 Others ask whether the
same "primary rights" are involved in the two actions.139 While
these phrasings allow ample room for reaching different conclu-
sions in particular cases, and courts sometimes apply them much
like the transactional test, in general these phrasings suggest a nar-
rower view of claim preclusion than the transactional test of the
Second Restatement.
The classic example comparing the broad and narrow definition
of a claim involves a plaintiff's assertion of personal injury and
property damage in separate lawsuits, usually following a motor
vehicle accident. Under federal and majority law, the later suit is
precluded because the claims arise out of the same transaction.140
A few states, however, treat personal injury and property damage
as separate claims and thus allow their assertion in separate
lawsuits.141
7. On the Merits
Claim preclusion also generally requires the prior judgment to
have been "on the merits."'1 42 No one disputes that a judgment
138. See, e.g., Benetton S.p.A. v. Benedot, Inc., 642 So. 2d 394, 399-402 (Ala. 1994);
Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 225, 228-30 (Ill. 1993) (denying claim
preclusion under the "same evidence" test); Agriserve, Inc. v. Belden, 643 N.E.2d 1193, 1194
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (granting claim preclusion under the "same evidence" test); Iowa Coal
Mining Co. v. Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 441-45 (Iowa 1996) (denying claim preclu-
sion under the "same evidence" test); see also RESTATEMENT (FrsT) OF JUDGMENTS § 61
(1942) (generally adopting the "same evidence" test).
139. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Board of Educ., 249 Cal. Rptr. 578, 584-85 (Ct. App. 1988).
140. See, e.g., Parrell v. Keenan, 452 N.E.2d 506 (Mass. 1983); Rush v. City of Maple
Heights, 147 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1958); Peterson v. Temple, 918 P.2d 413 (Or. 1996).
141. See, e.g., Holmes v. David H. Bricker, Inc., 452 P.2d 647, 649 (Cal. 1969); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 176 Cal. Rptr. 517,520 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1981); American
States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 477 S.E.2d 360, 364 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (relying on a Georgia
statute defining motor vehicle personal injuries and property injuries as separate causes of
action); Childers v. F.A.F. Motor Cars, Inc., 319 S.E.2d 90, 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (same);
Stephan v. Yellow Cab Co., 333 N.E.2d 223,226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); see also Olsen v. Breeze,
Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 826-27 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that under California's "primary
rights" definition, personal injury and property damage are separate causes of action);
Andrea G. Nadel, Simultaneous Injury to Person and Property as Giving Rise to Single Cause
of Action - Modem Cases, 24 A.L.R.4TH 646 (1983 & Supp. 1997).
142. The Second Restatement avoids the phrase "on the merits" because it may be misun-
derstood to refer only to judgments passing directly on the substance of a claim. Judgments
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entered after a full trial is on the merits. Nor would anyone dispute
that a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is not on the mer-
its.143 In borderline cases, however, jurisdictions diverge.
The leading "on the merits" divergence concerns dismissals for
failure to state a claim. Under federal law, a dismissal for failure to
state a claim 144 is treated as a judgment on the merits, unless the
court specifies otherwise. 145 Many states agree,146 but other states
take the contrary position that such dismissals generally are not on
the merits. Demurrers or dismissals for failure to state a claim are
not on the merits - and therefore are not entitled to claim-preclu-
sive effect unless the court specifies that the dismissal is with preju-
dice - in the states of California,147 Connecticut,148 Georgia, 149
not passing on the substance of a claim, such as default judgments or dismissals for failure to
prosecute, may nevertheless carry claim-preclusive effect. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoNr) OF
JUDGmENTs § 19 cmt. a (1982).
143. Thus, if a Texas court dismisses a case against a New York defendant because Texas
lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff can sue the defendant on the same
claim in New York without fear of claim preclusion based on the Texas dismissal. Of course,
this does not mean the plaintiff simply could sue again in Texas. If the plaintiff were to sue
the defendant on the same claim again in Texas, the prior determination of lack of personal
jurisdiction would be given binding effect under the doctrine of direct estoppel.
144. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) ("Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a
party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits."); Federated Dept. Stores
v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). To indicate that a dismissal is not on the merits, the
court can label it "without prejudice" or grant leave to amend.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoNrD) OF JuDGmENrs § 19 cmt. d & reporter's note (1982);
18 WIG-rr Er AL., supra note 104, § 4439.
147. Although California courts state the general rule that dismissals for failure to state a
claim are on the merits, the exceptions in California appear to have displaced the rule. In
Kanarek v. Bugliosi, 166 Cal. Rptr. 526 (Ct. App. 1980), for example, a California court
stated that "a demurrer which is sustained for failure of the facts alleged to establish a cause
of action, is a judgment on the merits. However, this is true only if the same facts are
pleaded in the second action, or if, although different facts are pleaded, the new complaint
contains the same defects as the former." 166 Cal. Rptr. at 530 (citations omitted); cf.
Keidatz v. Albany, 249 P.2d 264,265 (Cal. 1952) ("If... new or additional facts are alleged
that cure the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is not a
bar to the subsequent action whether or not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his com-
plaint."); Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 92 P.2d 804, 806-07 (Cal. 1939) (stating
that although a demurrer is on the merits, it does not bar a subsequent action where suffi-
cient facts are alleged in the second suit). It thus appears that California gives only direct
estoppel effect - rather than claim-preclusive effect - to dismissals based on a complaint's
insufficiency.
148. See Gottlob v. Connecticut State Univ., No. CV 930521148S, 1996 WL 57087 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 1996); Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., No. CV92 517506S, 1995 WL
216835 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1995), affda, 687 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1996).
149. See Buie v. Waters, 74 S.E.2d 883, 884-85 (Ga. 1953) ("[W]here a general demurrer
that does not go to the merits of the cause of action is sustained, the judgment will not be res
adjudicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same cause of action.");
Keith v. Darby, 122 S.E.2d 463, 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).
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Illinois,150 Maryland, 15' Massachusetts,' 52 Minnesota, 53 New
York,15 4 and Oregon. 55 Whenever a court dismisses a complaint
for failure to state a claim and does not specify whether the dismis-
sal is with prejudice, the claim-preclusive effect depends upon
whether the applicable preclusion law is that of the nine states men-
tioned above 5 6 or the preclusion law of some other jurisdiction. 5 7
150. See In re Estate of Cochrane, 391 N.E.2d 35, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that
where the dismissal could have been based on either a pleading defect or a substantive lack
of claim, "the respondents bear the burden of proving that the order dismissing the petition
was based on the merits"). But see ILL. S. CT. R. 273 (following the language of FED. R. Civ.
P. 41(b)).
151. See Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 297 A.2d 721, 726 (Md. 1972) ("'A judgment
or decree of dismissal after demurrer sustained because the plaintiff's pleading does not state
a cause of action does not bar a new action on sufficient pleadings."' (quoting 2 A.C.
FREEMAN, A TREAATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 748 (5th ed. 1925))).
152. In Massachusetts, a demurrer is deemed on the merits only if the plaintiff is granted
leave to amend and then fails to amend; otherwise, a demurrer generally is not on the merits
and does not bar a second action for the same claim. See Hacker v. Beck, 91 N.E.2d 832, 834
(Mass. 1950); Sullivan v. Farr, 309 N.E.2d 508 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974); see also O'Brien v.
Hessman, 114 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1962) (following a similar rule).
153. See H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 31 N.W.2d 277, 279-80 (Minn.
1948) ("Judgment of dismissal on the merits based upon the trial court's order sustaining
defendant's general demurrer of course does not constitute a bar to a subsequent action by
plaintiff based upon a complaint for the same cause, but alleging facts which.., set forth a
valid cause of action."); Rost v. Kroke, 262 N.W. 450, 451 (Minn. 1935) ("[I]f the plaintiff
fails on demurrer in his first action from the omission of an essential allegation ... the
judgment in the first suit is no bar to the second ... for the reason that the merits of the cause
were not heard and decided in the first action.").
154. See Amsterdam Say. Bank v. Marine Midland Bank, 528 N.Y.S.2d 184 (App. Div.
1988); Allston v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre, 267 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565-66 (App.
Div. 1966) ("[D]ismissal ... for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
... is not on the merits and does not bar another action brought for the same cause." (cita-
tions omitted)).
155. See Briggs v. Bramley, 177 F. Supp. 599, 600 (D. Or. 1959) (relying in part on
Oregon preclusion law and holding that "[a] judgment rendered because of defective plead-
ings is not considered to be a judgment on the merits within the operation of the res judicata
doctrine"); O'Hara v. Parker, 39 P. 1004, 1005 (Or. 1895).
156. Although these states adhere to the "minority view," they do not represent a trivial
component of U.S. law practice. These nine states contain over 40% of the nation's active
lawyers. See AtmRIcAN BAR ASSN., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- AN EDuCATIONAL CoNTIumum 15-16 (1992) (listing the estimated total number of active
resident attorneys in each jurisdiction as of December 1990-January 1991).
157. In Gottlob v. Connecticut State University, No. CV 930521148S, 1996 WL 57087
(Conn. Super.'Ct. Jan. 19,1996), for example, the plaintiff first sued in federal court on a First
Amendment claim, and the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Gottlob,
1996 WL 57087, at *4. The plaintiff, undaunted, sued in Connecticut state court. The state
court, following Connecticut preclusion law, held that the federal dismissal was not on the
merits and therefore no bar to the subsequent action. See Gottlob, 1996 WL 57087, at *4,
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Dismissals for failure to prosecute are treated as "on the merits"
under federal law unless the dismissal order specifies otherwise,158
but some states do not give preclusive effect to such dismissals. 159
8. Counterclaims
In the federal courts, a counterclaim is compulsory if it arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's
claim.160 If a party fails to assert a compulsory counterclaim, the
party is precluded from asserting that claim in a separate lawsuit.161
Most states have adopted compulsory counterclaim rules virtually
identical to the federal rule. 62
Nine states, however, have no compulsory counterclaim rule.163
They are Connecticut, 164 Ilinois,165 Maryland,166 Nebraska, 67 New
158. See FED. R. Crv. P. 41(b); Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 992 F.2d 100, 104 (7th
Cir. 1993); Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 832-33 (3d Cir. 1992).
159. See, &g., McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Hal v. City of La Salle, 679 F.2d 123,125-28 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1982) (apply-
ing Illinois law). In Har4 the federal courts allowed a subsequent claim after an Illinois state
court dismissal for failure to prosecute, because Illinois law does not deem such dismissals to
be on the merits. See 679 F.2d at 125-28 & n.4 (citing O'Reilly v. Gerber, 420 N.E.2d 425 (IlM.
App. Ct. 1981)). In Jenkins v. State, 615 So. 2d 405 (La. CL App. 1993), the plaintiff's action
was removed from Louisiana state court to federal court, the plaintiff's motion to remand
failed, and the suit ultimately was dismissed from federal court for failure to prosecute. The
plaintiff refiled in Louisiana state court. The state court held that the federal dismissal did
not bar the subsequent state court action, under Louisiana's "exceptional circumstances"
statutory exception to res judicata. See 615 So. 2d at 405-06. Under federal preclusion law, it
seems likely that the second suit would have been precluded.
160. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
161. See Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974). It is questionable
whether the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), permits federal rules directly to
govern preclusive effect. The claim-preclusive effect of the compulsory counterclaim rule can
be understood as common law "defense preclusion" that incorporates the requirement of the
compulsory counterclaim rule. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTs § 22(2) (1982);
Burbank, supra note 1, at 771-75. For a discussion of the interjurisdictional treatment of
compulsory counterclaim rules, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Linda J. Silberman,
Interjurisdictional Implications of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS LJ. 123, 160-
61 (1996).
162. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 426.30 (West 1980); Osno REv. CODE ANN. Civ.
R. 13(A); TEX. R. Crv. P. 97. See generally John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal
Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv.
1367 (1986).
163. It is important to note that even without a specific rule governing compulsory coun-
terclaims, some counterclaims can be subject to the common law of claim preclusion. See
Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir. 1979); Torcasso v. Standard
Outdoor Sales, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 225, 228-30 (Ill. 1993); Henry Modell & Co. v. Minister, 502
N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y. 1986).
164. See CoNN,. R. SUPER. Or. Civ. 116.
165. See Im.. CODE Civ. P. 5/2-608(a).
166. See MD. R. Crv. P. 2-331(a).
167. See NEB. R. Crv. P. 25-812, 25-813.
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York,168 Oregon, 169 Pennsylvania, 70 Virginia,171 and Wisconsin. 172
Michigan has adopted a unique twist: No counterclaims are com-
pulsory initially, but if a counterclaim is asserted, then the counter-
claim pleader must join all other claims that arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the original action.173
Seven states have largely adopted the federal compulsory coun-
terclaim rule but have added important exceptions. In Tennessee,
tort counterclaims are not compulsory. 74 In Alabama, Mississippi,
and Vermont, counterclaims are not compulsory if the plaintiff's
claim is for damage covered by liability insurance and the insurer is
entitled or obliged to conduct the defense.175 Presumably, these
three states reason that when a liability insurer handles the defense
on behalf of the defendant, it is unfair to penalize the defendant for
failing to assert a counterclaim because the defendant may have lit-
tle involvement in the conduct of the litigation. In Maine and
Rhode Island, counterclaims are not compulsory if the plaintiff's
claim is for damages involving a motor vehicle. 176 Finally, a Massa-
chusetts counterclaim is not compulsory if it is "based upon prop-
erty damage arising out of a collision, personal injury, including
actions for consequential damages, or death."'1 77
168. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3019(a) (McKinney 1991). The New York courts have empha-
sized, however, that res judicata sometimes can apply despite New York's lack of a compul-
sory counterclaim rule. See Modell 502 N.E.2d at 980 ("While New York does not have acompulsory counterclaim rule, a party is not free to remain silent in an action in which he isthe defendant and then bring a second action seeking relief inconsistent with the judgment inthe first action by asserting what is simply a new legal theory." (citation omitted)).
169. See OR. R. Civ. P. 22(A)(1).
170. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1031(a), 1510(a); Hunsicker v. Brearman, 586 A.2d 1387, 1390(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("In Pennsylvania, unlike the federal system, there is no compulsory
counterclaim rule." (quoting Martin v. Poole, 336 A.2d 363, 366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)).
171. See VA. R. S. CT. 3:8.
172. See Wis. STAT. § 802.07(1) (1975). But see Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green
Farm Assocs., 492 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the "common-law
compulsory counterclaim rule" applies if the second action would nullify the initial
judgment).
173. See MicH. CT. R. 2.203(A)(1); see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 162, at 1403n.208. Even in states without a compulsory counterclaim rule, a defendant who asserts apermissive counterclaim thereby subjects herself to the ordinary rules of claim preclusion,and must assert or forgo whatever else forms part of the "same claim" as the permissive
counterclaim. But Michigan's rule differs from the other states in that Michigan's rule appar-ently requires a defendant, upon asserting a permissive counterclaim, to assert claims related
to the plaintiffs original claim.
174. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 13.01.
175. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(3); Miss. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(3); VT. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(3).
176. See ME. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
177. MAss. R. Crv. P. 13(a).
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9. Preservation of Objection to Claim-Splitting
In Michigan, claim preclusion generally applies only if the party
asserting preclusion objected to the omission of the claim in the
original action. Michigan achieves this by a court rule establishing
compulsory joinder of claims. Specifically, Michigan Court Rule
2.203(A) ("Compulsory Joinder") provides that a pleading assert-
ing a claim must assert every claim the party has against the oppos-
ing party arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,178 and
then states:
Failure to object in a pleading, by motion, or at a pretrial conference
to improper joinder of claims or failure to join claims required to be
joined constitutes a waiver of the joinder rules, and the judgment shall
only merge the claims actually litigated. This rule does not affect col-
lateral estoppel or the prohibition against relitigation of a claim under
a different theory.179
This unique rule makes explicit what is implicit everywhere else -
that claim preclusion functions as a rule of compulsory joinder. It
also puts the burden on the defendant to decide, at the time of the
initial lawsuit, whether the plaintiff has transactionally related
claims that should be asserted at the same time.180
10. The Entire Controversy Doctrine and the One-Action Rule
The most peculiar state variation of res judicata is a bundle of
New Jersey claim preclusion rules known as the "entire controversy
doctrine." The gnarly tree of the entire controversy doctrine grew
from an acorn in New Jersey's 1947 Constitution, which allowed the
Superior Court's Law and Chancery Divisions to grant both legal
178. See MIcH. CT. R. 2.203(A)(1).
179. MicH. CT. R. 2.203(A)(2).
180. The rule's effect may be described as hastening the moment of waivability of the
defense of claim preclusion. In general, res judicata is an affirmative defense, waivable by
the defendant at the time of the second action. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Under the
Michigan rule, waiver by the defendant can occur during the first action. See Rogers v.
Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Assn., 275 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1979) ("The only innovative
aspect of the rule's waiver provision is that a defendant must now assert his or her objection
during the first suit when there exists an opportunity for plaintiff to cure the non-joinder
defect."). Another way to describe the rule's effect - probably more in line with litigators'
perceptions - is that at the time of the first action, it shifts the burden from the plaintiff to
the defendant to decide what claims need to be asserted.
With this waiver rule - little known outside the state - Michigan has taken a sensible
step toward reducing the unfairness and surprise that sometimes accompany claim preclu-
sion. The waiver rule may be less significant than it appears, however, because Michigan
courts have relied on the final sentence of Rule 2.203(A)(2) in applying claim preclusion to
prevent "relitigation of a claim under a different theory." See, e.g., Falk v. State Bar, 631 F.
Supp. 1515, 1521-22 (W.D. Mich. 1986), affdL, 815 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1987); Board of County
Rd. Comnirs. v. Schultz, 521 N.W.2d 847, 852 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 N.W.2d 829, 836 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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and equitable relief "so that all matters in controversy between the
parties may be completely determined."18  The doctrine has
evolved into a broad set of claim preclusion rules that require a
litigant to assert all transactionally related claims in a single action.
As to joinder of claims or counterclaims among present parties, the
doctrine largely mirrors federal claim preclusion doctrine and the
federal compulsory counterclaim rule. The entire controversy doc-
trine, however, goes further. Not only are related counterclaims
compulsory, but so are related cross-claims against coparties.182
More significant, if a plaintiff fails to assert a related claim against a
nonparty, that claim later may be precluded. 183 Thus, the entire
controversy doctrine imposes mandatory party joinder, enforced
through claim preclusion.
The entire controversy doctrine has figured prominently in
interjurisdictional preclusion cases. Consider the case of Mortgage-
linq Corporation v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Com-
pany. 84 Plaintiffs Mortgagelinq, a mortgage lender, and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the as-
181. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 3, 4.
182. See NJ. CT. R. 4:7-5(a) (making cross-claims "subject to the mandatory joinder pro-visions of R. 4:30A"); Win. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 375 A.2d 675, 684 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). Under the federal rules, by contrast, there are compulsory coun-terclaims but no compulsory cross-claims. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a) (compulsory coun-
terclaims) with FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (permissive cross-claims).
183. See Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr., 560 A.2d 1169, 1178 (N.J. 1989) ("[W]e now hold thatto the extent possible courts must determine an entire controversy in a single judicial pro-
ceeding and that such a determination necessarily embraces not only joinder of related claims
between the parties but also joinder of all persons who have a material interest in the contro-
versy."). The entire controversy doctrine's mandatory party joinder component has since
been codified as a civil practice rule, but its development is left largely to case law. See N.J.
C. R. 4:30A ("Non-joinder of claims or parties required to be joined by the entire contro-
versy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by
the entire controversy doctrine ... ."). This preclusion-based mandatory party joinder doc-
trine supplements a more familiar mandatory party joinder rule for necessary parties along
the lines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. See NJ. CT. R. 4:28-1.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently indicated a willingness to reconsider the meritsof such mandatory party joinder and asked the state's Civil Practice Committee to make
recommendations concerning the doctrine. See Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 643.46 (N.J.
1997).
184. 662 A.2d 536 (NJ. 1995). The Mortgagelinq case has spawned a significant body of
commentary, most of it - appropriately, in my view - highly critical. See, e.g., Burbank,
supra note 18, at 90-91; Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 137; Jonathan Neal Marcus,
Survey, Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 26 SETON HALL L. REv.
485, 489-90 (1995). Even in a wholly domestic context, the entire controversy doctrine's
mandatory party joinder has been widely criticized by the bar, the bench, and the academy.
See, e.g., Editorial. Entire Controversy, supra note 69. The most compelling argument
against it was offered by Professor Allan Stein. See Allan R. Stein, Commentary: Power,
Duty and the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RuTGERS L.J. 27 (1996).
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signee of some of the loans,185 sued several Pennsylvania defend-
ants for fraud in federal court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. While that federal action was pending, the plaintiffs
fied an action in New Jersey state court against several New Jersey
title insurers who allegedly were involved in the fraudulent
scheme.186 The New Jersey court applied the entire controversy
doctrine and dismissed Mortgagelinq's and Freddie Mac's claims
against the New Jersey defendants. The dismissal was upheld by
the New Jersey Supreme Court.187 Had the second action been
filed in federal court, or had the New Jersey courts applied federal
preclusion law, the claims against the New Jersey defendants would
not have been precluded, because federal preclusion law does not
include mandatory party joinder.188
The only other state to incorporate mandatory party joinder
into its preclusion law' 89 is Kansas. Kansas's version - known as
the "one-action rule"'190 - is milder than the New Jersey version, in
that the Kansas one-action rule applies only in comparative negli-
gence cases. 191 In fact, the one-action rule is the Kansas Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Kansas comparative negligence stat-
ute.192 In the absence of a prior comparative fault determination,
the rule does not apply.193 Like New Jersey's entire controversy
doctrine, the Kansas one-action rule includes not only mandatory
185. Freddie Mac was not an original plaintiff, but intervened as a plaintiff in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania suit. See Mortgagelinq, 662 A.2d at 538.
186. See 662 A.2d at 538.
187. See 662 A.2d at 539-42.
188. For other interjurisdictional preclusion cases raising the entire controversy doctrine,
see Giudice v. Drew Chem. Corp., 509 A.2d 200 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. granted and
summarily remanded on other grounds, 517 A.2d 448 (NJ. 1986); Gross v. Cohen DuFour &
Assocs., 642 A.2d 1074 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Kimmins Abatement Corp. v. Cones-
toga-Rovers & Assocs., 601 A.2d 256 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
189. One might question whether New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine and Kansas's
one-action rule are truly rules of "preclusion" rather than rules of "joinder" or some other
label. This article's discussion encompasses any rule - regardless of label - by which con-
sideration of claims or issues may be foreclosed based on a prior adjudication.
190. Some refer to it as the "one-trial rule." See, e.g., Griffin & Reitz, supra note 36, at
27; see also Mick v. Mani, 766 P.2d 147, 156 (Kan. 1988) (asserting that "the one-action rule
should, perhaps, more accurately be described as the one-trial rule").
191. See Miclk 766 P.2d 147; Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d
1127 (Kan. 1981).
192. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1987); Mick 766 P.2d at 150-51 (reviewing the one-
action rule's development as a reading of the Kansas legislature's intent in enacting § 60-
258a).
193. See Mick, 766 P.2d at 156 ("[A] plaintiff may pursue separate actions against
tortfeasors where there has been no judicial determination of comparative fault.").
February 1998]
HeinOnline  -- 96 Mich. L. Rev. 981 1997-1998
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:945
joinder of parties, but also mandatory cross-claims among co-
parties. 194
Tersiner v. Gretencord'95 provides an example of an inteijuris-
dictional application of the one-action rule. Plaintiff Tersiner
slipped and fell at a service station while on the job.196 He sued his
employer, Union Pacific Railroad, in a Federal Employers' Liability
Act claim in federal court.197 The federal court did not allow
Tersiner to assert a pendent party claim against Gretencord, the
owner of the service station, but it allowed Union Pacific to main-
tain a third-party claim against Gretencord for comparative implied
indemnity under Kansas law.198 The jury apportioned fault among
Tersiner (66%), Union Pacific (17%), and Gretencord (17%).199
The court entered judgment for Tersiner against Union Pacific but
rejected Union Pacific's comparative indemnity claim against
Gretencord.200 Subsequently, Tersiner sued Gretencord for negli-
gence in Kansas state court. The Kansas court dismissed the claim
under the one-action rule, holding that despite Tersiner's inability
to pursue his claim against Gretencord in the federal action, that
claim now was precluded because there had been a comparative
fault determination.201 "Tersiner had a strategic election to make,"
the appellate court explained in affirming the dismissal; rather than
194. See KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-213(g) (West 1994) ("Compulsory Cross-
Claim Against Co-party. In an action involving a claim governed by K.S.A. 60-258a and
amendments thereto, a party shall state as a cross-claim any claim that party has against any
co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim
governed by K.S.A. 60-258a and amendments thereto."); Teepak, Inc. v. Learned, 699 P.2d 35
(Kan. 1985).
195. 840 P.2d 544 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
196. For underlying facts, see Tersiner v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 90-3361, 1991 WL
225897 (10th Cir. Oct. 30, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
197. See Tersiner v. Union Pac. R.R Co., 754 F. Supp. 177 (D. Kan. 1990), affd., 947 F.2d
954 (10th Cir. 1991).
198. See 754 F. Supp. at 177-78. Tersiner's state law claim against Gretencord was dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 754 F. Supp. at 177-78.
199. See 754 F. Supp. at 178.
200. See 754 F. Supp. at 178-79.
201. See Tersiner v. Gretencord, 840 P.2d 544, 546-47 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). The court
emphasized that "Gretencord is not contending Tersiner's claim is barred by res judicata or
collateral estoppel, but by the provisions of the Kansas Comparative Negligence Act." 840
P.2d at 546. It nevertheless appears that issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) would have
provided an alternative basis for defeating Tersiner's claim against Gretencord. Tersiner and
Gretencord were both parties to the prior federal action and thus were bound by the jury's
determination of fault. If that factual determination, as a matter of issue preclusion, were
taken as conclusive in the subsequent suit, then Tersiner's claim would fail under Kansas
comparative fault law, which allows recovery only if the plaintiff is less than 50% at fault. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1987) ("The contributory negligence of any party in a civil ac-
tion shall not bar such party... from recovering damages for negligence... if such party's
negligence was less than the causal negligence of the party or parties against whom claim for
recovery is made.... ."). Because the federal jury found Tersiner 66% at fault, issue preclu-
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lose his claim against Gretencord, "[h]e could have dismissed his
federal action and instituted a claim against both the railroad and
Gretencord in state court. '202
HI. CHOICE OF PRECLUSION LAW: LEGAL ANALYSIS
In light of the preclusion law divergences discussed above, we
now turn to an analysis of whose preclusion law ought to apply in
interjurisdictional preclusion cases - that is, cases in which F2, the
forum of the lawsuit in which preclusion is asserted, differs from F1,
the forum of the initial lawsuit in which the potentially preclusive
judgment was rendered. Plausible sources of preclusion law might
include the preclusion law of F1;20 3 the preclusion law of F2; the
preclusion law of the jurisdictions whose substantive law governed
at F1 or at F2; or the preclusion law of the state in which F or F2 sits,
if either is a federal court sitting in diversity. It is my contention
that the appropriate choice in nearly every circumstance is the pre-
clusion law of F1. Before exploring these options, I briefly examine
the legal foundation for interjurisdictional preclusion.
A. Legal Foundation for Interjurisdictional Preclusion2°4
The root of American interjurisdictional preclusion is the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State."205 The Full Faith and Credit Clause, by referring to "judi-
cial Proceedings," requires each state to respect judgments ren-
dered by other state courts. Pursuant to this constitutional clause,
Congress in 1790 enacted the full faith and credit statute, requiring
respect for the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of states, ter-
ritories, and possessions of the United States.206
sion would destroy his subsequent state court claim, even in the absence of the one-action
rule.
202. Tersiner, 840 P.2d at 547.
203. By "the preclusion law of Fl," I am referring to Fl's domestic preclusion law, and
not, in conflict of laws parlance, to F1 's "whole law," which might incorporate by referencesome other jurisdiction's preclusion law.
204. This background has been covered well by others, see Burbank, supra note 1, at 739-
40,797-805; Degnan, supra note 1, at 742-45; a brief rendition should suffice for our purposes.
205. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060,
4063 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998) (describing the purpose of full faith and credit as to alter the status
of the states as independent sovereigns "'and to make them integral parts of a single nation'"
(quoting Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935))); Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (emphasizing the importance of full faith and
credit as a "nationally unifying force").
206. The current version of the statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
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In the state-state interjurisdictional configuration - in which F1is one state court and F2 is a different state court - a judgment's
binding effect is founded both on the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and on the corresponding statute. In the state-federal configuration
- in which F1 is a state court and F2 is a federal court - a judg-
ment's binding effect is based on the statute alone, because the con-
stitutional clause, by its terms, applies only to the effect of state
court judgments in other state courts.207
What about the federal-state configuration? Are state courts
obligated to give preclusive effect to the judgments of federal
courts? The Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute do not impose
such an obligation, but commentators have offered compelling ar-
guments that state courts have a federal obligation to respect fed-
eral court judgments.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause speaks only of the judicial pro-
ceedings "of every other state" and mandates that full faith and
credit be given "in each State. '208 By its terms, the constitutional
clause does not address federal courts at all. The full faith and
credit statute brings federal courts into the picture, but only as F2,the forum of the subsequent action, and not as F1, the forum of theprior action. The statute provides that
judicial proceedings [of any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States] ... shall have the same full faith and credit in everycourt within the United States and its Territories and Possessions asthey have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory orPossession from which they are taken.209
Because federal courts are included in "every court within the
United States," the full faith and credit statute requires them to
give full faith and credit to judicial proceedings. The judicial pro-
Aficionados of criminal procedure may wonder about the contrast between full faith and
credit and double jeopardy. Full faith and credit mandates interjurisdictional preclusion, but
there is no interjurisdictional double jeopardy. Under the "dual sovereignty doctrine," thefederal government can prosecute a defendant who has already been tried by a state for the
same crime. Likewise, a state can prosecute despite a prior prosecution by the federal au-thorities. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (state-federal); Bartkus v. Illinois,359 U.S. 121 (1959) (federal-state). Although the dual sovereignty doctrine appears to con-tradict the policy of full faith and credit, it can be understood simply as an instance of notbinding a nonparty, rather than as a refusal to give inteijurisdictional effect to judicial pro-ceedings. The second prosecuting sovereign is not the same party as, nor in privity with, the
first prosecuting sovereign. Under standard res judicata and full faith and credit principles,
the second prosecuting government therefore would not be bound. Alternatively, the dualsovereignty doctrine can be understood as analogous to the res judicata principle that claim
preclusion generally does not apply to claims that could not have been adjudicated in the
prior forum.
207. See U.S. CONSr. art. IV, § 1.
208. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1.
209. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
[Vol. 96:945
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ceedings to which full faith and credit must be given, however, in-
clude only those "of any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States," and not, according to the statutory language, judi-
cial proceedings of the United States itself. Thus, the statute ap-
plies by its terms to state-state interjurisdictional preclusion and to
state-federal preclusion, but not to federal-state preclusion.
Despite the clear language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and its implementing statute, some early cases point to those au-
thorities as the basis for federal-state preclusion. 210 Modem com-
mentators uniformly discredit these cases, not for their result, but
for their apparently unthinking misreading of the terms of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and statute.211 But still the cases stand,
with their references to full faith and credit not yet overruled. If,
on grounds of stare decisis, Hancock National Bank and the other
early full faith and credit cases are treated as good law, problems of
federal-state interjurisdictional preclusion are simplified somewhat.
On the other hand, it is difficult to defend a statutory reading so
210. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,
129 (1912) (considering federal-state preclusion under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
statute and holding that a federal judgment "is entitled to the same sanction which would
attach to a like judgment of a court of the State"); Hancock Natl. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S.
640, 645 (1900) (asserting, after invoking the constitutional and statutory full faith and credit
rule for state-state preclusion, that "[tihe fact that this judgment was rendered in a court of
the United States, sitting within the State of Kansas, instead of one of the state courts, is
immaterial"); Phoenix Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174, 185 (1896) (ex-
plaining that "the Constitution provides that full faith and credit shall be given" to federal
court judgments); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1883) (looking to the statute alone as a
basis for federal-state preclusion); see also Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265
U.S. 30, 33 (1924) (citing Hancock National Bank and Embry for the rule of federal-state
preclusion); National Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Supply Co., 183 U.S. 216,233
(1902) (holding that a state tribunal's failure to give due effect to a federal court decree
raised a federal question, citing, among other things, a state-state case in which preclusion
was founded on the Full Faith and Credit Clause (citing Jacobs v. Marks, 182 U.S. 583, 587
(1901))).
More recently, a Louisiana court reluctantly gave issue-preclusive effect to a federal judg-
ment because, in the court's view, that result was compelled by section 1738: "[Under the
federal full faith and credit statute we are bound to follow collateral estoppel in the instant
case. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires each state to give the same effect to the judg-
ments of state and federal courts as those judgments have in the jurisdiction where ren-
dered." Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 176 So. 2d 692, 696 (La. Ct. App.
1965); see also Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 153 n.1 (5th Cir.
1974) (noting that courts have read "into § 1738 a requirement that state courts extend full
respect to the judgments of federal judicial tribunals within the states"); Transamerica Trade
Co. v. McCollum Aviation, Inc., 424 N.E.2d 740,742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) ("Valid judgments of
Federal courts, just as valid judgments of state courts, must be given full faith and credit ..
(citing U.S. CONSr. art. IV and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1980))).
211. Se4 e.g., 18 WRiGirr T Ai-, supra note 104, § 4466, at 621; id. § 4468, at 651 ("On
the face of the statute, this conclusion is preposterous."); Burbank, supra note 1, at 740-47;
Lilly, supra note 18, at 291, 315 ("On its face, Section 1738 applies only when the initial
judgment is given in a state court.... [I]t is difficult to believe that if the question were
squarely put today, the Supreme Court would find that the statute controlled federal
judgments.").
February 1998]
HeinOnline  -- 96 Mich. L. Rev. 985 1997-1998
Michigan Law Review
plainly contrary to the text, particularly given the lack of attention
to statutory or constitutional interpretation in the cases. While the
cases stake out a clear and defensible legal position that state courts
are bound to give due effect to federal court judgments, their reli-
ance on full faith and credit takes the form of offhand cites to the
clause and statute rather than careful attention to constitutional or
statutory construction.212
If the constitutional and statutory full faith and credit provisions
do not apply, should federal-state preclusion be considered simply a
matter of state law? No doubt each state tribunal, left to its own
devices, ordinarily would choose to give due effect to federal judg-
ments.2 13 If a state court ever failed to do so, however, it is incon-
ceivable that the United States Supreme Court would be powerless
to reverse,214 and commentators have offered sound explanations
212. See Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 129; Hancock Natl. Bank, 176 U.S. at 645; Phoenix Fire &
Marine, 161 U.S. at 185; Embry, 107 U.S. at 9-10. One cure for the confusion surrounding
state courts' obligation to respect federal judgments would be to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to
cover the federal-state configuration. See infra text accompanying note 350 (proposing such
an amendment).
213. State courts take it as axiomatic that they must accord preclusive effect to federal
court judgments. See, e.g., Younger v. Jensen, 605 P.2d 813, 822 (Cal. 1980); Watkins v.
Resorts Intl. Hotel & Casino, 591 A.2d 592,598 (NJ. 1991); Bardo v. Commonwealth Dept.
of Pub. Welfare, 397 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979); see also Degnan, supra note 1,
at 744-45 n.17 (citing early cases reciting this rule). Some states establish the binding effect of
federal judgments by statute. See, e.g., CA_ CrV. PROC CODE §§ 1908-1909 (West 1980);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5401 (McKinney 1991) (defining "foreign judgment," for purposes of enforce-
ment proceedings, as "any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of
any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state"). Interestingly, the New
York provision appears to be based on an assumption that "full faith and credit" encom-
passes federal judgments.
214. In fact, despite the Court's unclear and unconvincing explanations in the early cases
based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute, the Court in those cases made one
thing perfectly clear: a state court's failure to give preclusive effect to a federal judgment was
reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court and would result in reversal. See Hancock Nat!. Bank,
176 U.S. at 645 ("We are of the opinion, therefore, that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
has failed to give to the judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Kansas that force and effect which it has within the limits of the State of Kansas, and that the
failure so to do is an error available in this court. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island must, therefore, be reversed .... "); Embry, 107 U.S. at 19 ("In restraining
further proceedings upon [the federal judgment], the Supreme Court of Errors of [Connecti-
cut] have not given it that due effect to which, under the authority of the Constitution and
laws of the United States, it is entitled. In that respect there is manifest error in its decree, to
the prejudice of the plaintiff in error, for which it must be reversed .... "). If the U.S.
Supreme Court has power to reverse a state court failure to respect a federal judgment, then
federal-state preclusion must be an obligation under federal law, because the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to review state court decisions is limited to issues of federal law. See 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1994); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 409 (1994) (noting that the issue-preclu-
sive effect of a federal judgment in a subsequent state court proceeding presents a federal
question); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 167 (1938); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S.
499,514-15 (1903) ("[W]hether a Federal judgment has been given due force and effect in the
state court is a Federal question reviewable by this court .... "). While I find the Court's
reading of full faith and credit indefensible, I agree with the Court's implicit understanding
that federal-state preclusion presents a federalism issue of constitutional dimensions.
[Vol. 96:945
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for imposing a federal-state preclusion obligation on the states as a
matter of federal law.
In his 1976 article, Federalized Res Judicata,215 Professor Ronan
Degnan powerfully advanced the argument that Article III of the
United States Constitution obligates state courts to respect federal
judgments, because the judicial power over cases and controversies
implies the power to render a judgment that carries binding effect.
"To decide a case or controversy implies some binding effect,"
Degnan argued; "[a] judgment or decree that lacked finality would
constitute something other than an exercise of the judicial
power. '216 He concluded that federal-state preclusion "will have to
be placed forthrightly on the ground that the integrity of the federal
judicial power is at stake. ' 217 Professor Charles Alan Wright, draw-
ing on Degnan's ideas, summarizes the argument this way:
Article I limits the federal judicial power to cases and controversies.
To decide a case or controversy implies some binding effect. Proceed-
ings that do not have at least the potential effect of precluding later
relitigation of the same claims and issues would constitute something
other than the exercise of the judicial power. Once it is accepted that
Article I and its implementing legislation have created courts with
the power to issue judgments that will have preclusive effects in other
litigation, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI mandates that those
preclusive effects are binding on state courts.218
Professors Degnan and Wright see the obligation of state courts to
respect federal judgments as having its roots in the federal laws that
give judicial power to the federal courts. The argument has at-
tracted adherents,21 9 and it finds support in at least one Supreme
Court opinion. Even before the string of Supreme Court opinions
relying inexplicably on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and stat-
ute,220 the Court, albeit somewhat cryptically, adopted the theory
that Article IlI and the federal jurisdictional statutes imply an obli-
215. Degnan, supra note 1.
216. Id. at 768-69.
217. Ik at 772-73.
218. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs 736-37 (5th ed. 1994) (citing
Degnan, supra note 1, at 742-49, 768-69).
219. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 cmt. a (1982) (suggesting that the
obligation derives from Article I and Article i); Watkins v. Resorts Intl. Hotel & Casino,
591 A.2d 592, 597 (NJ. 1991) (relying in part on Article III in finding an obligation to accord
preclusive effect to a federal judgment); WmGirr Er AL., supra note 104, § 4468, at 649 (ac-
cepting Article III as a basis for state courts' obligation to respect federal judgments); see
also Burbank, supra note 1, at 753-55 & n.92 (acknowledging Article IiI's relevance "in im-
posing a basic obligation to respect federal judicial proceedings" but disagreeing with
Degnan's reliance on Article III as a grant of power to federal courts to determine fully the
preclusive effects of their judgments).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
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gation on state courts to give preclusive effect to federal judgments.
In Dupasseur v. Rochereau,221 the Court held that a state court's
failure to give effect to a federal court judgment constituted a fed-
eral question and thus triggered the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court:
Where a State court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a court
of the United States rendered upon the point in dispute, and with
jurisdiction of the case and the parties, a question is undoubtedly
raised which... may be brought to this court for revision. The case
would be one in which a title or right is claimed under an authority
exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the title
or right so set up. It would thus be a case arising under the laws of the
United States, establishing the Circuit Court and vesting it with juris-
diction .... 222
The Dupasseur Court understood that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not apply to a federal-state configuration and pointed
out where it does apply: "The refusal by the courts of one State to
give effect to the decisions of the courts of another State is an in-
fringement of a different article of the Constitution, to wit, the first
section of article four .... ,22
Professor Degnan's Article III argument might be challenged
for failing to account for the preclusive effect of judgments ren-
dered by non-Article III federal tribunals, such as U.S. Bankruptcy
Courts,2-4 military courts,225 and the U.S. Tax Court.226 But
221. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 131 (1875).
222. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 134.
223. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 134.
224. See Abdallah v. United Say. Bank, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286,290 (Ct. App. 1996) (giving
claim-preclusive effect to a bankruptcy court order), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 746 (1997);
Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1179 (D.C. 1986) (applying claim preclusion to bar
claims that could have been asserted in prior bankruptcy court proceeding and stating that
"[t]he ordinary principles of resjudicata are applicable to bankruptcy decrees"); Hochstadt v.
Orange Broad., 588 So. 2d 51, 52-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (applying federal law to deter-
mine the issue-preclusive effect of a bankruptcy court determination that a debt had been
fully paid).
225. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 133 A.2d 207, 218 (Pa. 1957) (holding a military
court conviction admissible in state court criminal trial and stating, "[w]e have no authority
to inquire into or review the record of a court-martial; its judgment is conclusive on this and
other civil courts"); Commonwealth v. Smith, 563 A.2d 905, 910-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(upholding the use of a court-martial conviction for sentence enhancement but noting that
several state courts disagree), affd, 598 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1991).
226. See United States v. Bizanes (In re Estate of Bizanes), 109 N.W.2d 823, 825-26
(Mich. 1961) (holding a state probate court bound by U.S. Tax Court determination of tax
deficiencies and explicitly rejecting the argument that res judicata does not apply because the
tax court "is not a court, but an independent agency in the executive branch of the govern-
ment"); Tarutis v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Minn. 1986) (allowing a
state court assertion of issue preclusion based on a U.S. Tax Court determination of the
deductibility of farm losses); Kostelanetz, Ritholz, Tigue & Fink v. Himmelwright, 603 A.2d
168, 169-70 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (giving issue-preclusive effect, in a state court
legal malpractice counterclaim, to a U.S. Tax Court determination of the unreliability of tax-
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Degnan's logic extends to all tribunals established or empowered
by federal law. Any federal law establishing tribunals and authoriz-
ing them to adjudicate implies some binding effect and thus obli-
gates states to respect such adjudications. 227
Federal law establishing and empowering tribunals gives those
tribunals' judgments some binding effect. Federal law of claim pre-
clusion and issue preclusion, as a matter of federal common law,2 8
governs the scope of that binding effect. Further, this bundle of
federal law, governing the effect of federal judgments, binds the
state courts under the Supremacy Clause.229
B. Choice of Preclusion Law
Finding an interjurisdictional obligation to respect judgments
does not end the inquiry. To know the source of an obligation is
not the same as knowing the content of that obligation. Whose law
of claim preclusion and issue preclusion governs the interjurisdic-
tional effect of a judgment?
In interjurisdictional preclusion cases, courts could plausibly
consider applying the preclusion law of:
payer's income tax returns), affdL, 625 A.2d 488 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Hanson v.
Oregon Dept. of Revenue, 653 P.2d 964, 967-69 (Or. 1982) (upholding a state tax court's
application of issue preclusion based on a U.S. Tax Court judgment); cf. Estate of Ravetti v.
United States, 37 F.3d 1393, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a state court need not
give preclusive effect to a U.S. Tax Court judgment if a state court litigant was not a party to
the tax court's "innocent spouse" adjudication); M.A. Crowley Trucking, Inc. v. Moyers, 665
A.2d 1077, 1080 (N.H. 1995) (denying collateral estoppel effect of a U.S. Tax Court judgment
because the issue was not actually litigated).
227. Analogously, the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review certain state court
judgments implies that the state courts are bound by the Supreme Court's determinations in
those cases. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1993) (granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review certain judgments rendered
by "the highest court of a state").
228. See Lilly, supra note 18, at 316 & n.100; cf Burbank, supra note 1, at 753-78 (analyz-
ing the federal common law obligation to respect federal judgments but contending that state
preclusion rules may sometimes provide the content of that obligation).
229. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
Professor Burbank would break this Supremacy Clause analysis into two steps - source
of obligation and source of rules: "A federal common law obligation to respect [federal
court] judgments is binding under the supremacy clause. Moreover, to the extent that they
provide the measure of that federal obligation, the rules adopted to govern the preclusive
effects of federal judgments, whether furnished by federal or state law are also binding under
the supremacy clause." Burbank, supra note 1, at 763; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Federal
Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 TuxAs L. REv. 1551, 1565-71
(1992). I contend that federal preclusion rules do furnish the measure of the federal obliga-
tion to respect federal judgments, an obligation made binding on the states through the
Supremacy Clause.
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(3) the source of substantive law at F1;
(4) the source of substantive law at F2;
(5) the state in which F1 sits, if F1 was a federal court sitting in diver-
sity; and
(6) the state in which F2 sits, if F2 is a federal court sitting in diversity.
These options naturally divide into two sets: those that refer to F1
and thus render choice of preclusion law determinable at the time
of the initial action (the odd-numbered options), and those that re-
fer to F2 and thus make choice of preclusion law determinable only
at the time of the subsequent action (the even-numbered options).
As between these two sets of options, the essential question, dis-
cussed below in section III.B.1, is this: Is F2 relevant at all, or
should choice of preclusion law be determinable at F1? If, as I ar-
gue, the answer is that F2 is irrelevant and choice of preclusion law
should follow purely an F1 referent, then the next question, dis-
cussed below in section llI.B.2, is whether a pure F referent re-
quires application of Fl's preclusion law.
1. A Pure F Referent
Should choice of preclusion law be determinable by looking
solely at the initial lawsuit? The full faith and credit statute seems
to say so. It requires all state, territorial, and federal courts to give
state and territorial court judicial proceedings "the same full faith
and credit" that those proceedings "have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken." 30 Justice Story declared as early as 1813 that the full faith
and credit statute required a federal court to apply New York pre-
clusion law to determine the effect of a New York judgment.231 As
Professor Stephen Burbank has shown, the statute does not point
directly to F1's preclusion law but rather indicates an F1 referent -
that is, application of whatever preclusion law the rendering juris-
diction itself would use to determine the judgment's effect. 232 F2's
irrelevance, however, has by no means been universally accepted.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). The full faith and credit statute specifically refers to "judi-
cial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession [of the United
States]." 28 U.S.C. § 1738. This article often refers to configurations of state and federal
courts. State courts, as used in this context, should be understood to include U.S. territorial
courts as well.
231. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) (Story, J.).
232. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 797-800.
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a. Arguments Against a Pure F Referent. Various arguments
have been advanced against a pure F1 referent in state-state and
state-federal preclusion cases, notwithstanding the language of the
full faith and credit statute. The same arguments have been as-
serted against a pure F1 referent in federal-state preclusion cases,
where they carry more force because of the full faith and credit
statute's inapplicability. Some of the arguments focus on F2 qua
forum, urging that F2 has interests at stake and should be empow-
ered to apply its own preclusion law, at least to some extent. Other,
arguments focus on the interests of the source of law at F2 or, in
federal court diversity cases, on the state in which F2 sits.
The two most important arguments against a pure F referent -
what I call the "greater preclusion" argument and the "core preclu-
sion" argument - both concern the policy interests of F2 as the
forum. The forum of the second lawsuit has genuine interests at
stake in claim preclusion and issue preclusion decisions. The sec-
ond forum, by applying claim preclusion, preserves its judicial re-
sources by refusing to adjudicate a claim that has already been
decided.233 Similarly, by applying issue preclusion, the second fo-
rum preserves resources by taking certain already litigated issues as
conclusively determined. The finality-based interests of claim and
issue preclusion other than efficiency, such as repose for litigants
and respect for the judicial system, belong more to F1 than F2. But
F2's interest in its preclusion rules transcends judicial economy. In-
asmuch as preclusion rules limit the availability of adjudication at
F2, they raise concerns about justice and access.234
i. Greater Preclusion. Based on these forum interests, some
commentators have argued that F2 is permitted to give a judgment
greater preclusive effect than F1 would give.Z35 The full faith and
233. Courts thus sometimes address the public interest in finality in terms of the particu-
lar docket-control concerns of F2. Chief Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit, for example,
justified res judicata on grounds of "the interest of society and the courts in the final resolu-
tion of disputes. The explosion of federal dockets in recent years is so notorious as to require
no comment. Judicial resources today are an increasingly scarce commodity, and it is of the
utmost importance that litigants use them wisely." Schmieder v. Hall, 545 F.2d 768, 771 (2d
Cir. 1976). Cf. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878) ("flnterest reipublicae,
ut sit finis litium" it concerns the public that there be an end of litigation.).
234. These concerns primarily involve situations where F2 would give less preclusive ef-
fect than Fl. Therefore, while they may support the core preclusion argument, they do not
support the greater preclusion argument.
235. See David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cn. L. RFv. 317,
326-27 (1978); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by Prior Litigation, 74 Nw. U. L. Rnv.
742,749-53 (1979); Gene R. Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TExAs L. REv.
1209, 1228-29, 1265 (1986); Allan D. Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62
MxcH. L. REv. 33, 41, 52 (1963); Gregory S. Getschow, Comment, Ifat First You Do Succeed:
February 1998]
HeinOnline  -- 96 Mich. L. Rev. 991 1997-1998
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:945
credit statute's insistence that courts give "the same full faith and
credit" that the rendering court would give, according to this argu-
ment, means 6nly that courts may not give less preclusive effect
than the rendering court would give.
Courts occasionally act in explicit or tacit agreement with this
argument. For example, in Finley v. Kesling,23 6 an Illinois court
gave nonmutual issue-preclusive effect to a prior Indiana judgment
despite Indiana's adherence to the mutuality requirement.237 Thus,
the Illinois court gave the judgment greater preclusive effect than
the rendering forum would have given. The Illinois court adopted
the greater preclusive effect argument - that F2 does not violate
full faith and credit as long as it gives at least as much preclusive
effect as F, would give.238
The Mortgagelinq case239 provides another example. There, the
New Jersey state courts dismissed claims pursuant to the entire con-
troversy doctrine,2A° even though the rendering forum - the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania -
would not have held the claims precluded.241 Again, the greater
preclusive effect argument supports New Jersey's application of its
own preclusion doctrine, because the New Jersey courts gave more,
not less, binding effect to the judgment.
The greater preclusion argument should be rejected, however,
as it wrongly assumes that greater preclusion is none of Fl's con-
Recognition of State Preclusive Laws in Subsequent Multistate Actions, 35 ViLL L. Rnv. 253,
265, 276-80 (1990); see also 18 WRIGHT nr AL, supra note 104, § 4467, at 644-48 (discussing
but only partly endorsing the greater preclusion argument). The Supreme Court has used
language supportive of this argument. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) ("Full
faith and credit thus generally requires every State to give to a judgment at least the res
judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it.").
More recently, however, the Supreme Court seems to have rejected the greater preclusion
argument. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060, 4067-68 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1998) (Kennedy, I., concurring); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75,85
(1984).
236. 433 N.E.2d 1112 (I11. App. Ct. 1982).
237. See 433 N.E.2d at 1114. The Illinois court questioned whether Indiana would con-
tinue to cling to the mutuality requirement but considered itself free to give nonmutual
preclusive effect even if Indiana adhered to mutuality. See 433 N.E.2d at 1116-17.
238. See 433 N.E.2d at 1116-17 (explaining that the second state cannot reduce the effect
of the judgment, but can expand its effect); see also In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig.,
455 F. Supp. 999, 1005-06 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("[E]ven if Delaware courts would not permit the
offensive use of collateral estoppel, this court would give the Delaware judgment greater
preclusive effect than Delaware courts.").
239. Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1995).
240. The entire controversy doctrine includes New Jersey's rule of mandatory party join-
der enforced through claim preclusion. On the entire controversy doctrine and Mortgage-
linq, see supra text accompanying notes 181-88.
241. See Mortgagelinq, 662 A.2d at 537, 540-41.
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cern. The argument ignores the impact of preclusibn law on litiga-
tion behavior at F1. In Finley, the Illinois court (F2) failed to
appreciate that participants in the Indiana lawsuit (F1) based their
conduct on the understanding that the judgment could not later be
invoked by nonparties. Indiana legitimately may expect and desire
its litigants to conduct themselves on that understanding. For ex-
ample, Indiana may prefer to avoid the aggressive litigation con-
duct, delay tactics, and expansive joinder that nonmutual preclusion
can engender.242 In Mortgagelinq, the New Jersey court (F2) appar-
ently was untroubled by the possibility that the plaintiffs in the
Pennsylvania federal court lawsuit (F1) made joinder decisions
based on the federal courts' legitimate choice not to mandate join-
der of all possible defendants.243
Some commentators have suggested that cases involving the
interjurisdictional application of statutes of limitations support the
greater preclusion argument, but only when F2 merely closes its
own doors to the claim and does not purport to extinguish any sub-
stantive rights.2 4 If a state dismisses an action under its statute of
limitations, a second state generally may apply its own longer stat-
ute of limitations and allow the claim. 245 In other words, some
shorter statutes of limitations are treated as "door-closing rules"
that bar the assertion of claims in a particular state but have no
effect elsewhere. 46 If states are allowed to bar claims based on
their own idiosyncratic statutes of limitations, the argument goes,
242. Professor Graham Lilly makes this point persuasively by emphasizing the uncer-
tainty for litigants if F2 may apply its own greater preclusion rule: "Since it is uncertain
where the next suit will be filed, the parties will have an incentive to conduct the first suit as
if the stakes are high. In this context, the public and private resources invested in the initial
suit are apt to be disproportionately large .... Familiar pretrial skirmishing such as motion
practice, discovery, and jury selection will expand to reflect the added risk of future litiga-
tion." Lilly, supra note 18, at 312-13.
243. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 100-01.
244. See Perry Dane, Sovereign Dignity and Glorious Chaos: A Comment on the In-
terjurisdictional Implications of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUrGERs L.i. 173, 185-
86, 188 (1996); Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 159-60, 168. Professor Dane uses
the statute of limitations analogy to suggest that New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine,
although generally perceived as a rule of preclusion, should be treated as a mere procedural
door closer that can be applied by New Jersey courts as F2 to dismiss claims based on prior
litigation elsewhere. See Dane, supra, at 185-86, 188.
245. See Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 145-46, 159-60 & n.176, 168 & n.219.
Moreover, a state may invoke its own statute of limitations to refuse enforcement of another
state's judgment, even if the state that rendered the judgment would not time-bar the en-
forcement. See Dane, supra note 244, at 186 n.40.
246. In this regard, they are analogous to dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens
or for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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they should be allowed to invoke their own idiosyncratic preclusion
rules to disallow relitigation of claims in their own courts.247
The statute of limitations analogy is unpersuasive. Courts ap-
plying preclusion rules virtually never purport to be applying mere
"door-closers. ' 248 Moreover, statutes of limitations do not create
the pervasive strategic incentives engendered by preclusion law, in
particular by those preclusion rules on which U.S. jurisdictions di-
verge.249 If F2 applies its own preclusion law rather than F1 's, itundermines the litigation-related policies of F1 and betrays the le-
gitimate expectations of the participants at F1 on which they may
have based significant litigation decisions.2 0
ii. Core Preclusion. In addition to the "greater preclusion"
argument, there is the "core preclusion" argument. Some commen-
tators contend that F2 only need respect the "core" preclusion val-
ues of F1 and may apply its own preclusion law as to matters outside
that core.25 1 The argument, in essence, is that full faith and credit
or other interjurisdictional preclusion obligations should apply only
247. Professors Dreyfuss and Silberman advance the statute of limitations analogy to
show that New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine can be considered a "housekeeping" doc-trine designed primarily to prevent relitigation within the New Jersey courts and that it there-
fore may be permissible for New Jersey to apply the doctrine based on its interest as F2. SeeDreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 159-60, 168. They conclude, however, that the
doctrine should apply only when both F, and F2 are New Jersey state courts, because only inthat situation are New Jersey's resources burdened twice. See id. at 170-71; see also Dane,
supra note 244, at 185-86 & n.40 (articulating a version of this argument to suggest that New
Jersey courts may apply the entire controversy doctrine to bar claims based on prior litigation
elsewhere).
The "door-closing" argument for allowing F2 to apply its own greater preclusion rulesdepends in part on characterizing those preclusion rules as "procedural" rather than "sub-stantive." In this regard, it is interesting to note Professor D. Michael Risinger's argument
that the core res judicata rule prohibiting double recovery is substantive, but most of the
rules of issue preclusion and claim preclusion are procedural. See D. Michael Risinger, "Sub-
stance" and "Procedure" Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of
"Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. Rlv. 189,210-11 (1982). Note, however, that forinterjurisdictional preclusion problems, it will not suffice to label preclusion rules "proce-
dural"; we still must determine whether we are talking about FI's procedural concerns or F2's.The main point of this article is that even if preclusion rules can be characterized as largely"procedural," the most important procedural concerns implicated are those of F,.
248. The only contrary example of which I am aware is Mortgagelinq, in which the NewJersey Supreme Court barred the plaintiff's claim under the entire controversy doctrine but
asserted that its dismissal should not preclude the plaintiff from asserting the same claimelsewhere. See Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 536,541-
42 (N.J. 1995).
249. See supra Part I (discussing strategic incentives); supra section II.B. (discussing pre-
clusion law divergences).
250. Although F2 mitigates the problem inasmuch as its dismissal does not extinguishsubstantive rights, it still betrays the policies of F, if litigants at F, made decisions based on an
expectation of access to a particular state's courts.
251. See 18 WirHT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4467, at 625.
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to the extent necessary to protect the rendering forum's interest in
its own judgment. While a rendering jurisdiction has an interest in
safeguarding the validity of its judgments, the argument goes, it has
much less of an interest in such details as whether its judgments are
given nonmutual issue-preclusive effect.252 This "core preclusion"
argument is advanced in the leading treatise on federal procedure:
The central core of [res judicata] rules must of course be followed to
support the finality, repose, and reliance values that are common to
res judicata policy in all states. Many other rules should be followed
to support the first court's power to control its own procedures.
Nonetheless, it is not desirable to suppose that every last variation of
preclusion policy is so far part of the judgment that full faith and
credit commands obedience. To the contrary, there are many situa-
tions in which the res judicata effects of a state court judgment are
properly controlled by the domestic rules of a second state. The key
to understanding the scope of full faith and credit lies not in a mono-
lithic view that all res judicata rules are indistinguishable but in a
careful appraisal of the purposes that underlie different rules.Z53
The argument has been attributed to Professor Edward Cooper.2 4
Professor Cooper's application of the core preclusion view to mutu-
ality is instructive. If F1 requires mutuality, he argues, F2 should not
allow nonmutual preclusion even if F2 has abandoned the mutuality
requirement. On the other hand, if F1 would allow nonmutual pre-
clusion, then F2 need not follow Fl's preclusion law and can apply
its own mutuality requirement to disallow issue preclusion.
According to Professor Cooper, F2 should respect F1's mutuality
rule because
[a]ssertion of nonmutual preclusion in such circumstances would
make it impossible for the first court to give effect to policies that may
include broad freedom in selecting parties, freedom to litigate a par-
ticular case according to its own needs without concern about the im-
pact on other cases, and acceptance of results that seem just between
particular parties even though a new trial or directed verdict would be
required if the stakes were greater.255
But Professor Cooper does not see the same concerns in the reverse
situation and would allow F2 to disregard F1's nonmutual preclusion
rule:
252. See id. § 4467, at 642-43 ("[A] court that prefers to deny nonmutual preclusion
should not be required to follow the rules of another court. Nonmutual preclusion is simply
not so central a component of res judicata as to be swept into full faith and credit." (footnote
omitted)).
253. Id. § 4467, at 625.
254. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 95.
255. 18 WmwGrr ET AL., supra note 104, § 4466, at 617.
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The major values served by nonmutual preclusion lie in the publiccosts of relitigation and the fear of inconsistency. A later court
should be free to assume the costs of relitigation. And a first courtshould not be able to inflict on others its timorous fears of being
proved wrong.2 6
Compare Cooper's view with the greater preclusion argument,
which leads to exactly the opposite conclusion. The greater preclu-
sion argument would allow F2 to disregard F1's mutuality require-ment - that is, to give greater issue-preclusive effect to the
judgment than F1 would give - but would not allow F2 to disregard
F1's rule allowing nonmutual preclusion.2 7
Professor Cooper's core preclusion argument has drawn criti-
cism for ignoring the full faith and credit "policy of unifying and
integrating the several states"' ' 8 and for violating the litigation poll-
cies inherent in F1's preclusion rules.259 My earlier discussion of
preclusion law divergences and litigation incentives underscores
that criticism by showing that the points of preclusion law on which
jurisdictions vary create powerful litigation incentives at F1. Thecore preclusion argument fails to give enough respect to Fl's inter-
est in the litigation policies fostered by its preclusion rules. Profes-
sor Cooper correctly demonstrates that F1 's litigation policies areimplicated by F2's disregard of F1's mutuality rule. But he does not
recognize that F1's litigation policies are equally implicated by F2'sdisregard of F1's nonmutuality rule. A rule allowing nonmutual
preclusion seriously affects litigation incentives in the first forum.
Among other things, it makes parties more likely to settle, more
likely to join additional parties to achieve a complete resolution of
the controversy, and more likely to litigate zealously.260 While F1need not foster these incentives, F1's choice to foster them should
not be disregarded by other jurisdictions.
iii. The F2 Law Supplier. In addition to arguments concern-
ing F2's interests as forum, some have argued that preclusion law
should give way based on the interests of the source of substantive
law in the subsequent lawsuit.261 This argument has arisen espe-
256. Id.; see also id. § 4467, at 647-48.
257. See Getschow, supra note 235, at 277-79 (arguing that issue preclusion - especially
greater effect - is merely a matter of F2's policy choices and that full faith and credit there-fore does not apply).
258. Burbank, supra note 18, at 96.
259. See id. at 97.
260. See supra Part I.
261. See, e.g., Maijorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling Administrative Deci.
sionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. LJ. 368 (1990); Donald W. Nierling,
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cially in cases where F2 is a federal court hearing a federal question
claim. Giving preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment
raises concerns about divesting the federal courts of power to ad-
dress civil rights violations and other federal matters.
The Supreme Court has rejected this argument against preclu-
sion, leaving open only the narrowest possibility of such substantive
law exceptions to full faith and credit. In Allen v. McCurry,262 for
example, a state court in a criminal trial had ruled against a criminal
defendant on certain Fourth Amendment search and seizure is-
sues. 263 The criminal defendant subsequently brought a civil sec-
tion 1983 claim in federal court based on the same alleged Fourth
Amendment violations.264 The Supreme Court ruled that issue pre-
clusion could be used against the criminal defendant turned plain-
tiff, thus preventing relitigation of the Fourth Amendment issues. 265
Federal law would displace the full faith and credit obligation, the
Court held, only if Congress specifically intended to create an ex-
ception to full faith and credit by legislating a partial repeal of the
full faith and credit statute.266 This has proved to be a narrow loop-
hole indeed; the Supreme Court has yet to find a federal statute
that displaces full faith and credit under this "partial repeal" analy-
sis. 267 To the extent that a federal statute can effect a partial repeal
of section 1738, that establishes a narrow exception to a pure F1
referent in state-federal preclusion cases.268
Note, The Role of Preclusion Rules in Title VII: An Analysis of Congressional Inteni 71
IOWA L. REv. 1473 (1986).
262. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
263. See 449 U.S. at 92.
264. See 449 U.S. at 92.
265. See 449 U.S. at 103-05.
266. See 449 U.S. at 97-99; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873,
881 (1996); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,381 (1985);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,468-72 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
JurGmEtrs § 28 cmt. e (1982) (recognizing the possibility of a legislative policy exception);
Andrea Catania, Access to the Federal Courts for Title VII Claimants in the Post-Kremer Era:
Keeping the Doors Open, 16 LOYOLA U. Cm. L.J. 209, 224-25 (1985).
267. See JACK H. FRiEDENTHAL ET Ai., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.12, at 681 (2d ed. 1993)
("The Supreme Court has yet to identify any federal statute as embracing an exclusivity
principle that would prevent the normal operation of collateral estoppel."). Actually, the
federal habeas corpus statute can be viewed as an exception to full faith and credit. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 1997) (permitting federal court habeas corpus relief from
state court adjudications that are "contrary to... clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court" or that are "based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding"); see also Brown v.
Alien, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
268. The federal constitutional requirement of minimal due process provides another as-
pect of federal law that limits the application of either intra- or interjurisdictional preclusion
doctrine. For example, except in narrowly defined situations, the due process requirement
does not allow a nonparty to be bound by a judgment. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 116
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iv. Misplaced Erie. Finally, some courts have taken the posi-
tion that where F2 is a federal court hearing state law claims, that
court should apply the preclusion law of the state in which it sits.
For example, in Itzkoff v. F&G Realty of New Jersey, Corp.,269 F,
was a New York state court, and F2 was the federal court for the
District of New Jersey, sitting in diversity. The federal court ap-
plied New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine to determine the
preclusive effect of the New York judgment because it treated the
situation as an Erie problem and looked to the law of the state in
which it sits.270 The court's Erie concerns, however, were mis-
placed. As Professor Degnan ably demonstrated, even where F2 is
a federal court sitting in diversity, F2's preclusion decision should be
guided not by Erie but rather by the full faith and credit statute.2 71
Some courts have wandered even further astray and have con-
ducted Erie analyses to conclude that F2's preclusion law should ap-
ply when F2 is a state court and F1 was a federal court sitting in
diversity. For example, in Douglas v. First Security Federal Savings
Bank,272 a Maryland state court grappled with the claim-preclusive
effect of a judgment of the federal court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. The claim-preclusive effect of the prior judgment de-
pended on whether Douglas was in privity with a party to the prior
federal suit. The Maryland court, relying on the Erie doctrine,
chose to apply its own Maryland preclusion law to determine priv-
ity.273 Douglas's Erie analysis is even more misplaced than
Itzkoff's, because in Douglas the only state in which a relevant fed-
eral court sat was Virginia. Thus, if any Erie analysis were appro-
priate, it would have been to protect uniformity between the
Virginia state and federal courts. Maryland has nothing to do with
it.
S. Ct. 1761, 1765 n.4 (1996); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 4046 (1940). Also, no full faith
and credit is due a judgment rendered by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction, see
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729-31 (1877), or a decree that exceeds the authority of the
issuing court, see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060, 4065 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1998).
269. 890 F. Supp. 351 (D.N.J. 1995).
270. See 890 F. Supp. at 355-59.
271. See Degnan, supra note 1, at 750-55. Because the full faith and credit statute man-
dates an F, referent, no F2 Erie analysis is warranted. But even if the court conducts an Erieinquiry at F 2, the appropriate inquiry, under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), would ask whose preclusion law the F2 state courts would apply.See 313 U.S. at 496. As argued in this article, the answer to that question should point to F1 'spreclusion law.
272. 643 A.2d 920 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
273. See 643 A.2d at 924-25.
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b. Arguments in Favor of a Pure F Referent. Neither the
greater preclusion argument, the core preclusion argument, the law
supplier argument, nor Erie provides a sound reason to abandon a
pure F1 referent. At least for the state-state and state-federal con-
figurations, statutory language demands a pure F1 referent. The full
faith and credit statute does not say that courts must give "at least
as much faith and credit" to judgments as the rendering jurisdiction
would give. Nor does the statute say that courts must give "a cen-
tral core of faith and credit" to judgments. It most assuredly does
not say that a court must give full faith and credit except when it is
applying its own substantive law, or except when it is a federal court
hearing a state law claim. Rather, the statute says that courts must
give "the same full faith and credit" that the rendering jurisdiction
would give.274 Despite the statute's clarity on this point, we should
venture beyond "the statute says so." Not only is a deeper resolu-
tion more satisfying, but in the federal-state configuration, in which
it is doubtful that the full faith and credit statute applies,275 a reso-
lution based on more than statutory language is essential.
As a matter of litigation policy, the applicable preclusion rules
must be determinable at F and must not depend on where the sub-
sequent case is filed. At F1, practitioners and their clients make
critical decisions concerning joinder of claims, joinder of parties, re-
source allocation, appeal, delay, settlement, criminal pleas, consoli-
dation, class certification, jury trial, and other matters. Preclusion
law affects these decisions.276 At the same time, nonparties make
critical decisions concerning intervention, involvement, and testi-
mony. Preclusion law affects these decisions as well.2 7 7 These ac-
tors cannot wait until a subsequent action is filed before they know
whose preclusion rules will apply.
Moreover, in all of these litigation decisions, Fl's policies are at
stake. As discussed in Part I, each jurisdiction makes "genuine
value choices" 278 in selecting among preclusion law possibilities.
For example, a broad definition of "same claim" induces joinder of
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (emphasis added). I may be criticized for emphasizing
the word "same," because that word arrived in 1948 with legislative history calling it a change
"in phraseology." See Burbank, supra note 18, at 99-100 & n.63. But even the statute's
original 1790 language indicates a pure F1 referent: "judicial proceedings ... shall have suchfull faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law
or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken." Act of
May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 208-12.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 19-54.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
278. Resnik, supra note 20, at 981-82.
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related claims, yielding fewer separate lawsuits but rendering each
lawsuit more complex. A jurisdiction may choose to encourage
joinder in order to reduce the number of independent lawsuits and
to make each adjudication as complete as possible. Alternatively, a
jurisdiction may choose not to encourage such joinder, in order to
avoid unnecessarily complex multiclaim lawsuits and to avoid pres-
suring litigants into asserting claims they might otherwise forgo.
Each jurisdiction's law of claim preclusion and issue preclusion re-
flects a balancing - albeit not necessarily a skillful balancing - of
competing interests. These competing interests include judicial
economy, completeness of adjudicative resolution, zealousness of
advocacy, litigant autonomy, and public reliance on the finality of
adjudication.279
This is not to say that the second forum lacks any legitimate
interest. F2's application of claim and issue preclusion advances F2's
interest in judicial economy and reflects a balancing between truth-
seeking and efficiency. While there is no denying the judicial econ-
omy power of a dismissal based on claim preclusion, it is hard to
sympathize with F2's judicial economy concerns in the context of
interjurisdictional preclusion, where by definition F2 has not ex-
pended any judicial resources in the first lawsuit.3 0 Nor can one
deny F2's interest in the integrity of its own adjudications, especially
where F2 would allow the assertion of claims or the relitigation of
issues by giving less preclusive effect than would F1.
But for purposes of articulating a sound rule for choice of pre-
clusion law, F2's interests pale in comparison to those of Fl. This is
not because F2's interests are small, but because they come into
play so infrequently. F2's interests come into play only in cases in
which a party actually asserts claim preclusion or issue preclusion at
F2. Preclusion-sensitive decisions at F1, by contrast, come into play
whenever there is a possibility of a future assertion of claim preclu-
sion or issue preclusion. Whenever that possibility exists, as it does
in an enormous range of lawsuits,2 81 it may affect the litigation be-
havior of participants at F1. Litigators handling F, lawsuits with a
possibility of related litigation elsewhere will make strategic deci-
sions based on the preclusion law that they expect will be applied.
If litigators in a mutuality jurisdiction expect the mutuality rule to
govern, then they will make joinder and settlement decisions on
that basis. If they expect that other jurisdictions will ignore F1's
279. See supra text accompanying notes 62-71.
280. See Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 168.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 2-14.
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mutuality rule and allow nonmutual preclusion based on F2's own
preclusion law, then they may decide differently. Likewise, if liti-
gators in federal court in Kansas expect federal preclusion law to
govern the effect of the judgment even if a subsequent action is
brought in Kansas state court, they will make strategic decisions on
that basis; if they expect Kansas's one-action rule to apply, they will
make very different decisions, such as joining additional parties.
Thus, F2's interests arise with only a fraction of the frequency with
which F1's interests arise. By the sheer number and significance of
litigation decisions affected by preclusion law,282 and the breadth of
cases in which such considerations arise,283 Fl's concerns should
dominate. In sum, F2's undeniable interests cannot overcome the
litigation participants' need to determine the applicable preclusion
rules at the time of the initial action and F1's interest in controlling
litigation behavior in its courts.
2. Probing the F Referent
Thus far, I have argued that F2 generally should be disregarded
for purposes of determining applicable preclusion law and that the
governing preclusion law should be determinable at Fl. In other
words, I have argued in favor of a pure F1 referent. But a pure F
referent does not necessarily require the application of F1's own
preclusion law. Using our F referent, whose preclusion law should
apply?
a. The F Law Supplier. Even with F2 out of the picture, F is
not the only sovereign with genuine interests at stake. In addition
to F1 and F2, the jurisdiction that supplied the substantive law at F1,
if the applicable law was neither F1's nor F2's, may claim an interest.
If substantive rights determined at F are jeopardized by the preclu-
sion law applied at F2, that may impinge on the interests of the law-
supplying jurisdiction.284 On this reasoning, some courts apply the
preclusion law of the F law supplier.285
282. See supra text accompanying notes 19-71.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 2-14.
284. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 808-09; Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 139-
52.
285. See Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying
Louisiana's statutory claim-preclusion exception to determine the effect in an Arkansas fed-
eral court of a prior Louisiana federal court diversity judgment and explaining that "[w]hen a
federal court is sitting in diversity, the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is determined by
the preclusion rules of the forum which provided the substantive law underlying that prior
judgment"); Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Carco Rentals, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1143, 1157
(W.D. Ark. 1996) (applying Oklahoma preclusion law to determine the effect of an
Oklahoma federal court diversity judgment, upon an explicit finding that the prior court ap-
plied Oklahoma rather than Arkansas substantive law). Although the Follette and Philadel-
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For example, suppose a dispute involving a New York contract
and governed by New York law is litigated in New Jersey state
court. The court finds that New York contract law does not provide
a remedy on the facts pleaded and dismisses for failure to state a
claim but does not state whether the dismissal is with prejudice.
Subsequently, the plaintiff refiles in Connecticut state court, and
the defendant asserts that the action is claim precluded. Under
New Jersey (F1) preclusion law, the dismissal is "on the merits" and
therefore claim preclusive; under Connecticut (F2) preclusion law,
the dismissal is not "on the merits" and therefore not claim preclu-
sive. 8 6 But what about New York? Doesn't New York - the F1
law supplier - have an interest in the finality of adjudications con-
cerning New York contracts, and therefore shouldn't the Connecti-
cut court consider New York preclusion law?
The law supplier's interest should not govern choice of preclu-
sion law for at least two reasons. First, the substantive law interests
of the law-supplying jurisdiction, just like F2's judicial economy and
fairness interests,287 are at stake only in the lawsuit in which claim
or issue preclusion is asserted. Fl's litigation-behavior interests, by
contrast, are at stake in every F1 litigation that might involve subse-
quent related suits in other jurisdictions. For each case in which the
F law supplier's interest matters, there may be dozens in which F1
litigators behave differently based on anticipated choice of preclu-
sion law.
Second, the law supplier's interest in the preclusion outcome
bears no relationship to its adoption of particular preclusion rules.
In our hypothetical contract dispute, the outcome may matter to
New York because it involves rights under New York contract law.
New York therefore has an interest in whether the New Jersey dis-
missal is given preclusive effect in Connecticut. But New York's
interest in the dispute has nothing to do with New York's preclusion
rule that dismissals for failure to state a claim are not on the mer-
its. s8s New York's preclusion rule derives from New York's rela-
tively technical pleading requirements.,8 9 If New York pleading
phia Indemnity decisions could be understood as Erie applications, see infra text
accompanying note 301, the opinions speak about the provider of the substantive law at F1,not about the state in which the federal F sat.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 142-57.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 280-81.
288. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
289. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3013 (McKinney 1991). As one observer put it, "New York's ties
to the Field Code remain strong and its flirtation with notice pleading has not yet ripened
into commitment." Oakley & Coon, supra note 162, at 1411; see also id. at 1411 n.280 (citing
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rules render complaints more likely to be dismissed for technical
defects than for substantive shortcomings, then it makes sense for
New York to deem such dismissals nonpreclusive unless the judge
specifies otherwise.290 There is no reason for New York's preclu-
sion rule, derived from pleading and practice in New York courts,
to govern preclusion in a dispute involving only New Jersey and
Connecticut courts.
This analysis suggests a possible exception. When a preclusion
rule is clearly linked to a substantive right of action, then perhaps
that rule should accompany the right of action, regardless of the
litigation's locus.291 It is an exception in search of an application,
however, as nearly all preclusion rules are transsubstantive.292 With
the possible exception of the Kansas one-action rule, which is an
interpretation of the Kansas comparative negligence statute,293
rules of claim and issue preclusion are not linked to, and do not
depend on, the substantive rights asserted.
Of course, the law supplier need not be a third sovereign. Very
often either F1 itself or F2 will supply the applicable law at F1.
When F1 is applying its own substantive law, that only adds to what
I contend are the already dominant interests of F1. But what if the
F law supplier is F2? In our hypothetical contract dispute, suppose
the second action were filed in New York state court. Should the
combined interests of New York as law supplier and New York as
second forum overcome the interests of New Jersey as initial
forum?
Note that to arrive at this configuration of interests, the F law-
supplying jurisdiction need not be F2. The same configuration of
interests presents itself whenever the F law-supplying jurisdiction
and F2 share a preclusion rule that differs from that of Fl. In our
original hypothetical, neither New York (law supplier) preclusion
law nor Connecticut (F 2) preclusion law would treat the dismissal as
New York cases "demand[ing] specificity as to the particular elements of the cause of action
being pleaded").
290. See Potter v. Emerol Mfg. Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 68,70 (App. Div. 1949) ("As the merits
are not considered on [a demurrer], a determination dismissing the complaint for insuffi-
ciency on its face would not bar a second suit based on a sufficient complaint.").
291. See Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 139-52 (discussing this theory under
the label "embedded rights").
292. Transsubstantive rules apply across all substantive areas of law, as, opposed to non-
transsubstantive rules, which apply only to specifically defined areas of law or rights of action.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, are mostly transsubstantive. See
Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 12, at 994 n.17.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 190-94; see also Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra
note 161, at 140 & n.90 (mentioning the one-action rule as a possible application of embed-
ded rights theory).
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claim preclusive. Thus, the question is whether the combined inter-
ests of the law supplier and F2 - whether or not the same jurisdic-
tion - should trump the interests of F1. As explained above, the F
law supplier's interest merits little concern, because with few excep-
tions, the law supplier's interest in the outcome is entirely uncon-
nected to its own preclusion rules.294 Allowing choice of preclusion
law to depend on F2 raises serious concerns about preclusion rules
that are not determinable at the time of the first action - that is, by
a pure F1 referent.295 With the rare exception of preclusion rules
linked explicitly to substantive rights, the law supplier's attenuated
interest in the preclusion rules applied to the dispute, whether or
not paired with the interest of F2, does not alter the soundness of
choosing Fi's preclusion law.2 96
b. The Meaning of a Judgment. Moreover, it makes sense that
the meaning of a judgment ought to be construed according to the
renderer's rules. When a court enters a judgment, that judgment
carries various meanings, including its stare decisis value and its
narrative value to those involved in the dispute and to the commu-
nity at large.297 In general, though, with the exception of litigation
pursued purely for symbolic import, a judgment's primary meaning
is its binding effect. That meaning cannot be ascertained by looking
at the judgment alone. Rather, the meaning of a judgment depends
upon the rendering jurisdiction's rules for construing its meaning -
that is, the rendering jurisdiction's law of judgments.298 Just as the
meaning of legislation should be defined by the legislating sover-
eign's rules of statutory construction, including any relevant statu-
294. See supra text accompanying notes 288-93.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 276-83.
296. For another analysis reaching the same conclusion, see Lilly, supra note 18, at 325-26
(arguing that all approaches to choice of law analysis point to F1 's preclusion law). But seeBurbank, supra note 1 (arguing that federal interests sometimes should trump in the state-
federal configuration if federal substantive rights are at stake).
297. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1085 (1984) ("[A judge's]
job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitu-
tion and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them.");
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739,755 (1982) ("[T]he judge
... gives meaning and expression to the values embodied in [a legal] text.").
298. Justice Ginsburg nicely captured this idea in her phrasing of a recent full faith and
credit decision in which she noted that preclusive effects "travel with the sister state judg-
ment." Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060,4064 (U.S. Jan. 13,1998). In tying
a judgment's meaning to its source, I do not mean to suggest that a judgment's meaning
depends on the subjective intent of the rendering judge. As Justice Kennedy emphasized in
his Baker concurrence, "The question... is not what a trial court intended in a particular
case but the preclusive effect its judgment has under the controlling legal principles of its own
State." Baker, 66 U.S.L.W. at 4068 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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tory definitions and applicable "Dictionary Act,12 99 the meaning of
a judgment should be defined by the rendering jurisdiction's rules
of judgment construction, including the law of claim preclusion and
issue preclusion.300
c. Erie. If the interjurisdictional preclusion problem arises in
the federal-state configuration and the federal court's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, then choice of
preclusion law presents an Erie30' question. A number of commen-
tators have written on this issue and reached differing conclu-
sions.302 Federal courts, too, have split on the issue.30 3 Although
the Erie analysis is essential for understanding one slice of federal-
state interjurisdictional preclusion, it should be noted that Erie is
irrelevant to other interjurisdictional configurations, and also that
299. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (federal Dictionary Act); N.Y.C.L.S. GENL. CoNS- .
LAW §§ 1-121 (McKinney 1951 & Supp. 1997-1998) (New York General Construction Law).
The federal Dictionary Act includes, among other things, provisions that "words importing
the plural include the singular," 1 U.S.C. § 1, that "[t]he word 'company'... shall be deemed
to embrace the words 'successors and assigns of such company. . . "' 1 U.S.C. § 5, and the
controversial 1996 addition specifying that "the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife," 1 U.S.C. § 7.
300. The problem of discerning "the meaning of a judgment" can be viewed as a subset of
the more general problem of interpreting texts. In this regard, it is worth considering the
hermeneutics work of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur has described certain char-
acteristics of written work that he collectively calls "distanciation." One aspect of distancia-
tion is the separation of meaning from the author's intent: "[W]riting renders the text
autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer
coincides with what the author meant; henceforth, textual meaning and psychological mean-
ing have different destinies." PAUL RiCOEUR, The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,
in HRmmNurics & TE SocLtL ScmNcEs 139 (J. Thompson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1981). Distanciation's counterpart, according to Ricoeur, is "appropriation
(Aneignung) of the text, its application (Anwendung) to the present situation of the reader."
Id. at 143.
For interjurisdictional preclusion, Ricoeur's distanciation thesis packs a certain amount of
explanatory power. F, renders a judgment, which by the act of writing is rendered independ-
ent of FI's intended meaning. When that judicial text is read in the context of a subsequent
proceeding in another jurisdiction, F2 treats the judgment as an autonomous text and "appro-
priates" the judgment to its own situation, much as a reader of a novel understands the work
in light of the reader's circumstances. In fact, although I disagree with its normative implica-
tions in this context, Ricoeur's model describes well the findings discussed in Part IV of this
article - that many state judges reflexively apply their own jurisdiction's preclusion law, with
little or no attention to the source of the judgment. See infra text accompanying notes 316-
37.
301. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
302. See Burbank, supra note 1; at 747-62; Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclu-
sion and Federal Common Law: Toward a General Approach, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 625, 635-
37 (1985); Degnan, supra note 1, at 753-73; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on the Sub-
stance of Finality, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 642, 643-47 (1985); Lilly, supra note 18, at 322-27;
Shreve, supra note 235, at 1211 n.3.
303. Compare, e.g., Austin v. Super Valu Stores, 31 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the
preclusion law of the state in which the first federal diversity court sat) with Apparel Art
Intl., Inc. v. Amertex Enters. Ltd., 48 F.3d 576 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying federal preclusion
law). See also 18 WRiGHT FT Ai., supra note 104, § 4472.
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the Erie argument applies equally to intramural federal-federal pre-
clusion. If the initial forum was a federal court adjudicating a state
law claim, then the subsequent forum faces the Erie question
whether that subsequent forum is a state court or another federal
court.
Erie analysis offers no fully satisfying answer to whether, if F is
a federal court sitting in diversity, F2 should apply the preclusion
law of the state in which F1 sits.3 4 The stronger argument is that,
even in the Erie context, F2 should apply F1 's (federal) preclusion
law. First, under Hanna v. Plumer,305 we must ask whether any fed-
eral rule or statute governs.30 6 In some cases involving the claim-
preclusive effect of nonjoinder of claims or parties, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 13(a), 18, 19, and 20 arguably apply, just as Rule
41(b) informs the "on the merits" determination. To that extent,
the federal rules would trump state preclusion law unless the rules
exceed the rulemaking authority granted by the Rules Enabling
Act.30 7 In most situations, however, no federal rule or statute di-
rectly governs claim and issue preclusion; federal res judicata is
largely federal common law.
Second, the analysis proceeds to examine what the Supreme
Court has called "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws." 308 On these points, the argument for state preclusion law
gains force. Inequitable administration of the laws - significantly
different outcomes based on whether a case is decided in state or
federal court - could follow from a decision that federal preclusion
law applies when F is a federal court sitting in diversity. Moreover,
perspicacious practitioners might well forum shop on that basis. On
the other hand, one can hardly characterize preclusion as rules that"substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human con-
304. Because courts have exhibited confusion about this, I should emphasize that the Erie
question is whether to apply federal preclusion law or the state preclusion law of the state
where federal F, sits. The question is not whether to apply the preclusion law of the state of
F2. Compare Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP Inc., 584 A.2d 1214 (Del. 1991) (addressingthe correct Erie question) with cases cited in Lilly, supra note 18, at 322 n.117 (incorrectly
using Erie to apply F2's state preclusion law). See supra text accompanying notes 269-73.
305. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
306. See 380 U.S. at 471.
307. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988);
Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1987); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-
74. Professor Burbank argues persuasively that under the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot directly govern preclusive effect, but the rules can create a
context in which federal common law legitimately governs preclusive effect. See Burbank,
supra note 1, at 772-75.
308. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
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duct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation. '309
While preclusion rules affect behavior, their impact on behavior
outside of litigation is virtually nil. The impact of preclusion at F1 is
not on the primary conduct of citizens of the state in which F1 sits,
but rather on F1 's policies as a litigation forum - that is, on the
federal court's power to control its own procedures.
It is analytically useful to separate the interests of the state in
which F1 sits from the interests of the law supplier. Very often, of
course, the federal diversity court applies the substantive law of the
state in which it sits. In those normal circumstances, the F1 state is
also the law supplier, and therefore may appear to have a substan-
tive interest in the outcome of preclusion questions. But as ex-
plained above, because the law supplier's interest in the outcome
generally has no connection to the law supplier's adoption of partic-
ular preclusion rules, it should be discounted for purposes of choice
of preclusion law.310
Even if concerns of forum-shopping and vertical uniformity
might lead one to consider application of state law under Erie, that
does not end the analysis. If there is a countervailing federal inter-
est, then courts must consider whether that federal interest over-
rides application of the state rule.311 In the case of federal-state
preclusion, the countervailing federal interest includes all of the
federal forum's interests in controlling litigation behavior through
preclusion rules. Weighing this interest requires a consideration of
both the strategic incentives created by those aspects of preclusion
law that diverge and the value choices inherent in those litigation
incentives.312 The federal judicial system has a legitimate interest in
the litigation incentives created by federal preclusion law. By con-
trast, the state in which the federal court sits has limited legitimate
interest in the litigation behavior of actors in federal court.3 13
309. 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 288-93.
311. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958); see also
Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (balancing federal and
state interests but concluding that both sets of interests could be accommodated). If the
accommodationist aspect of Gasperini prevails, it might lend support to Professor Cooper's
"core preclusion" approach to interjurisdictional preclusion cases. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 251-59 (discussing and criticizing the core preclusion argument). Professor
Cooper's approach seeks to accommodate the interests of both F, and F2, but it could con-
ceivably be adapted to the Erie context to require application of the state's "core" rules while
allowing application of federal preclusion rules outside the core.
312. See supra Part I.
313. One exception is the federal jury burden on a state's citizens.
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Admittedly,, the Erie question is a close one. If we emphasize
the federal interest in federal court litigation procedures, as I sug-
gest is appropriate given this article's demonstration of the signifi-
cance of Fl's interest, federal law prevails. If we emphasize forum-
shopping concerns and vertical uniformity, state law prevails. Ulti-
mately, the answer need not depend on Erie, because it is achieva-
ble by legislation. If this article is correct that a clear rule for
interjurisdictional preclusion is essential and the better rule is that
F1's preclusion law governs,314 then to whatever extent Erie stands
in the way, the answer is to amend section 1738 to mandate applica-
tion of Fl's preclusion law in federal-state cases.3 15
IV. CHOICE OF PRECLUSION LAW: EMPIRIcAL ANALYSIS
In all the literature discussing how courts ought to handle in-
terjurisdictional preclusion problems, there has not been any broad
examination of how courts in fact do handle interjurisdictional pre-
clusion problems. I set about this task, focusing primarily on the
most interesting configuration - federal-state.3 16 The findings in
the federal-state configuration can be summed up as follows:
(1) F2 usually applies its own preclusion law rather than federal pre-clusion law.
(2) F2 rarely pays any attention to choice of preclusion law.
(3) It often does not matter whether F2 applies its own or federalpreclusion law, because the preclusion result would be the same.
(4) It sometimes does matter, however, whether F2 applies its own orfederal preclusion law, and even in those cases F2 often applies itsown law.
Of the 286 federal-state preclusion cases examined, the state
court relied solely on its own state preclusion law in 169 cases
(59%). The state court relied on federal preclusion law in 62 cases
(22%). In an additional 36 cases (13%), the court appeared to rely
on both its own and federal preclusion law.317 In 16 cases (6%), the
court cited neither state nor federal law in support of its preclusion
314. See infra text accompanying notes 340-50.
315. See infra text accompanying note 350 (proposing such an amendment).
316. The research was conducted on Westlaw, searching all state court cases between
January 1, 1991, and August 5, 1996, for preclusion terms and for references to federal court.
The search produced 703 cases, of which 286 proved on examination to involve the preclusive
effect of a federal judgment in a subsequent state court proceeding. Those 286 cases were
examined to determine whose law the court used in addressing the preclusive effect of the
federal judgment.
317. In some of these cases, courts cited both state and federal cases without any analysis
of whose law applied. In others, courts stated explicitly that the same result would follow
from either state or federal preclusion law.
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determination; presumably these judges relied on their own under-
standing of preclusion law - presumably, their own state's preclu-
sion law. Thus, in a substantial majority of federal-state preclusion
cases, state courts looked wholly or primarily to their own state law
of preclusion, rather than to the preclusion law of the jurisdiction
that rendered the judgment.
Certain state courts are more sensitive than others to interjuris-
dictional responsibilities. The courts of Texas and Louisiana usually
apply federal preclusion law in the federal-state configuration,318
and the courts of California and Florida apply federal preclusion
law about half the time.319 If these four states are excluded from
the sample, the remaining states relied solely on their own state
preclusion law in seventy percent of the cases and relied on federal
law in only twelve percent.3 20
Few of the cases show any serious analysis of choice of preclu-
sion law. In fact, not many show any analysis whatsoever of choice
of preclusion law. For the most part, the state courts appear to ap-
ply their own preclusion law reflexively. They see a question of
claim preclusion or issue preclusion, and they address the question
just as they would if the original case had been in their own state
courts.32 1
Moreover, the courts fare no better in the sixteen federal-state
cases in which it appears likely that choice of preclusion law deter-
mined the preclusion outcome. Of those cases, F2 applied its own
state preclusion law twelve times,322 applied federal preclusion law
318. See, e.g., Vergae v. Lamaze, 670 So. 2d 599 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Fernandez v. Memo-
rial Healthcare Sys., 896 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App. 1995).
319. See, e.g., Abdallah v. United Say. Bank, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286 (Ct. App. 1996) (apply-
ing federal law); Wimsatt v. Beverly Hills Weight Loss Clinics Intl., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612 (Ct.
App. 1995) (applying California law); Andujar v. National Prop. & Cas. Underwriters, 659
So. 2d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (applying federal law); West v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg.
Corp., 595 So. 2d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (applying Florida law).
320. In the remaining 18% of cases, the court either cited no precedent to support its
preclusion decision, or cited both state and federal preclusion law.
321. See, e.g., City of Rolling Meadows v. National Adver. Co., 593 N.E.2d 551, 556-57
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Trammell v. State, 622 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 1993); American Home Assur-
ance Co. v. International Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 241 (App. Div. 1996), revd. on other grounds,
661 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. 1997).
322. See Benetton S.p.A. v. Benedot, Inc., 642 So. 2d 394, 399-400 (Ala. 1994) (denying
claim preclusion under the Alabama "same-evidence" test, when on the facts of the case, the
federal transactional test may have resulted in claim preclusion); Wimsatt 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
614-17 (refusing to give preclusive effect to a California federal court's determination of the
enforceability of a Virginia forum selection clause, when under federal law of issue preclu-
sion or direct estoppel, the determination probably would have been considered conclusive);
Gottlob v. Connecticut State Univ., No. CV 930521148S, 1996 WL 57087, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 19, 1996) (under Connecticut law, denying claim preclusion on the ground that fed-
eral rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was not on the merits, when federal law would give dismissal
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three times,323 and once applied the preclusion law of the state in
which F1 sat.324 The cases in which choice of preclusion law mat-
tered involved a wide variety of preclusion law divergences, includ-
ing mutuality,325 same claim,326 entire controversy doctrine,32 7
claim-preclusive effect); Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., No. CV92 517506S, 1995 WL
216835, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1995) (same), affaL, 687 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1996); Rolling
Meadows, 593 N.E.2d at 556-57 (denying claim preclusion primarily under the Illinois "same
evidence" test, when on the facts of the case, the federal "transactional" test may have re-
suited in claim preclusion); Jenkins v. State, 615 So. 2d 405,406-07 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (rely-
ing on the "exceptional circumstances" exception under the Louisiana res judicata statute,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 13:4232(A)(1) (West 1983), to deny claim-preclusive effect to a federal
court dismissal for failure to prosecute, when under federal preclusion law, dismissal would
have been claim preclusive); Douglas v. First Sec. Fed. Savings Bank, 643 A.2d 920, 924-29
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (applying Maryland law of privity and nonparty preclusion to a
judgment of the Eastern District of Virginia and finding a nonparty bound based on the
nonparty's involvement in litigation, when under federal law, the involvement may not have
risen to level of control required for nonparty preclusion under Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147 (1979)); Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 536,
539-42 (N.J. 1995) (applying New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine to a prior proceeding
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and precluding claims against defendants not joined
in the federal action, when under federal law, claims against nonjoined defendants can be
pursued separately); Evans v. Cowan, 468 S.E.2d 575,576-77 (N.C. Ct. App.) (denying claim
preclusion under the North Carolina "identity of causes of action" test, when the factual basis
for the suits was identical, so the federal transactional test would have deemed the state suit
to be the same claim as the federal suit, although preclusion may have been unwarranted
because the federal court remanded the state claims), affd., 477 S.E.2d 926 (N.C. 1996);
Lamontagne v. Board of Trustees, 583 N.Y.S.2d 838, 840-41 (App. Div. 1992) (applying New
York law to find state law claims not claim precluded by a federal court judgment on a
federal ERISA claim based on the same facts, on the theory that "implicit" state claims are
not precluded by federal dismissal of federal claims); Moldovan v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No.
C.A. 92CA005375, 1993 WL 46656, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1993) (denying claim
preclusion under Ohio precedent holding that an intentional tort claim is not the same claim
as a worker's compensation claim, because the tort claim raises "additional issues," when it
may have been considered the same claim under the federal transactional test); Dual &
Assocs. v. Wells, 403 S.E.2d 354, 356 (Va. 1991) (applying the Virginia mutuality requirement
to deny issue preclusion asserted defensively by a nonparty to a federal action, when under
federal law, defensive nonmutual issue preclusion would have been permitted, although issue
preclusion may have failed under the identical issue requirement).
323. See Hochstadt v. Orange Broad., 588 So. 2d 51, 52-53 & n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (applying federal law to allow defensive nonmutual issue preclusion, when under
Florida law mutuality probably would have been required, although the court suggests that
the result would be the same under Florida law); Reeder v. Succession of Palmer, 623 So. 2d
1268, 1271-75 (La. 1993) (applying federal claim preclusion law to preclude state law claims
based on the same Ponzi scheme as prior federal securities law claims, when under Louisiana
civilian res judicata, state claims would not have been precluded); Vergne, 670 So. 2d at 600-
03 (granting claim preclusion under federal law, when if filed before 1991, the claims would
not have been precluded under Louisiana civilian res judicata).
324. See Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc., 584 A.2d 1214, 1216-19 (Del. 1991) (ap-
plying the Kansas mutuality requirement to deny issue preclusion based on the diversity
judgment of a Kansas federal court, when under either federal law or Delaware law, non-
mutual issue preclusion would have been permitted).
325. See Columbia Cas., 584 A.2d at 1216-19; Dual & Assocs, 403 S.E.2d at 356.
326. See Benetton S.p.A., 642 So. 2d at 399-400; Rolling Meadows, 593 N.E.2d at 556-57;
Evans, 468 S.E.2d at 576-77; Moldovan, 1993 WL 46656, at *2-3.
327. See Mortgagelinq, 662 A.2d at 539-42.
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Louisiana's idiosyncracies,328 and treatment of Rule 12(b)(6) dis-
missals as not on the merits.329
F2's propensity to apply its own preclusion law in the federal-
state configuration is overwhelming. Could the explanation be that
F2 looks to its own state preclusion law because F1 was a federal
court sitting in diversity in that state? No. Many of the cases in
which F2 applied its own state preclusion law were federal question
cases at F1.330 Moreover, in cases in which F, was a federal court
sitting in diversity in a different state from F2, F2 generally applied
its own preclusion law rather than the law of the state in which F1
sat.331 The results thus do not turn on state courts' conducting si-
lent, sophisticated Erie analyses to determine whose preclusion law
F1 would apply.
Although I have not undertaken a similarly thorough analysis of
state-state interjurisdictional preclusion cases, it is clear that state
courts sometimes apply their own preclusion law rather than the
328. See Reeder, 623 So. 2d at 1271-75 (under "civilian res judicata" prior to new statute);
Vergne, 670 So. 2d at 601-03 (same); Jenkins v. Louisiana, 615 So. 2d 405, 406-07 (La. Ct.
App. 1993) (under new statute).
329. See Gottlob v. Connecticut State Univ., No. CV 9305211485, 1996 WL 57087, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 1996); Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., No. CV92 517506S, 1995
WL 216835, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1995), affd., 687 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1996). The
Gupta court applied Connecticut preclusion law in deciding that the federal dismissal was not
on the merits and therefore was not entitled to claim-preclusive effect. See Gupta, 1995 WL
216835, at *4. The court, however, ought never to have reached that issue. The plaintiff
initially filed both state claims and a federal section 1983 claim in state court. The defendant
removed the case to federal court, where the section 1983 claim was dismissed for failure to
state a claim. Having dismissed the federal claim, the federal court declined to continue to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims and remanded those state claims to
state court. See Gupta, 687 A.2d at 114 n.7. On remand, the state court was not hearing a
new action, but rather the original action that had been bounced into federal court and back.
Thus, claim preclusion should not have applied. In any event, claims are not precluded if the
initial court lacked or declined jurisdiction to hear those claims. See Keystone Builders, Inc.
v. Floor Fashions of Va., Inc., 829 F. Supp. 181, 185 (W.D. Va. 1993); First Interstate Bank of
Denver v. Central Bank & Trust Co. of Denver, 937 P.2d 855, 858-59 (Colo. App. 1996);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e (1982).
330. See, e.g., Gottlob, 1996 WL 57087 (First Amendment claim); Gupta, 1995 WL 216835
(itle VII, ERISA, and other federal statutory claims); Jenkins, 615 So. 2d 405 (section 1983
claim); Lamontagne v. Board of Trustees, 583 N.Y.S.2d 838 (App. Div. 1992) (ERISA and
Taft-Hartley Act claims).
331. See, e.g., Putnam Resources v. Frenkel & Co., No. CV 123838 S, 1995 WL 416194
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 1995) (applying Connecticut law to determine the issue-preclusive
effect of a District of Rhode Island diversity judgment); Douglas v. First Sec. Fed. Say. Bank,
643 A.2d 920 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (applying Maryland law to determine the claim-
preclusive effect of an Eastern District of Virginia diversity judgment); Morgan Guar. Trust
Co. of New York v. Staats, 631 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (applying Pennsylvania law to
determine the claim-preclusive effect of a Southern District of New York diversity judg-
ment). The sole exception is Columbia Casualty Co. v. Playtex FP Inc., 584 A.2d 1214 (Del.
1991), in which the Delaware court applied Kansas issue preclusion law to determine the
effect of a judgment from the District of Kansas.
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law of the rendering state.332 Other courts, however, have referred
to the full faith and credit statute and applied the preclusion law of
the rendering jurisdiction.333 Some courts, though applying their
own preclusion law rather than the rendering state's, nevertheless
demonstrate sensitivity to interjurisdictional concerns. 334
Federal courts, on the whole, appear more attuned to interjuris-
dictional concerns than state courts. In the state-federal configura-
tion, federal courts regularly acknowledge that the full faith and
credit statute governs the effect they must give to state court judg-
ments.335 When federal courts fail to apply F1's preclusion law, it isnot out of the reflexive application of their own law that is common
among the state courts in the federal-state configuration. Rather, it
is through misapplication of Erie analysis, through reliance on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine,336 or through use of federal standards
332. See, e.g., Ditta v. City of Clinton, 391 So. 2d 627, 629 (Miss. 1980) (relying onMississippi issue-preclusion law to determine the effect of a Louisiana judgment); Giudice v.
Drew Chem. Corp., 509 A.2d 200 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (applying New Jersey's entire
controversy doctrine to preclude a New Jersey action for failure to join claims in prior New
York action), cert. granted and summarily remanded on other grounds, 517 A.2d 448 (N.J.1986); Middleborough Horizontal Prop. Regime Council v. Montedison S.p.A., 465 S.E.2d765, 769 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (relying on South Carolina's adoption of offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion to determine the effect of a Minnesota judgment).
333. See, e.g., Speed v. Speed, 341 So. 2d 156, 159-60 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976); Miller v.Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Neb. 1975); see also Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 509 N.W.2d 829, 835-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (relying primarily on Michigan claim
preclusion law but declining to apply Michigan's claim preclusion waiver rule to a litigant's
failure to object to nonjoinder in a prior Kentucky proceeding).
334. For example, in Erenberg v. Cordero, 683 A.2d 567, 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996), the court looked to New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine to determine whether
product liability claims against General Motors were precluded by a prior wrongful death suitin New York state court. The court allowed the claims by relaxing the entire controversydoctrine based on "equitable considerations," including that the only basis for preclusionwould be New Jersey's idiosyncratic doctrine. The concurring judge, especially, was reluctant
to apply New Jersey's preclusion law based on proceedings in another state. See Erenberg,
683 A.2d at 573-74 (Stem, J., concurring).
335. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1997) (care-
fully examining Texas law to determine the issue-preclusive effect of a Texas guilty plea);Warda v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Michigan law to deter-
mine the claim-preclusive and issue-preclusive effect of a Michigan probate court decree);Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127, 1128-29 (Kan. 1981) (re-
sponding to a certified question from a U.S. district court concerning the effect of a prior
Kansas state court judgment under the Kansas one-action rule). Recent Supreme Court
cases involving state-federal preclusion have emphasized that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires fed-eral courts to apply the preclusion law of the state that rendered the judgment. See Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060, 4064-66 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998) (noting that preclusiveeffects "travel with the sister state judgment," but holding that a Missouri federal court need
not give full faith and credit to a Michigan state court injunction that exceeded the authorityof the Michigan court); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873, 877 (1996);
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985); Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982).
336. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rookerv. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), prevents
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while purporting to apply state preclusion law. First, instead of ap-
plying F1's preclusion law, some federal courts in diversity cases
mistakenly apply the preclusion law of the state in which they sit.337
Second, at least one federal court has cited the federal Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to support dismissal of a claim that would not
have been precluded under state preclusion law.3 38 Third, some
federal courts, while purporting to apply state preclusion law, have
in fact applied something more closely resembling their own federal
preclusion law.339
Federal courts in general have treated interjurisdictional preclu-
sion problems with greater sophistication than many state courts.
But in all three U.S. interjurisdictional configurations - federal-
state, state-state, and state-federal - courts too often fail to give
prior judgments the respect that they deserve.
CONCLUSION: A CLEAR RULE
Excessive procedural debate only tends to make courts bur-
dened, lawyers rich, and everybody else confused. Particularly in
areas in which predictability matters, such as when litigators must
make strategic decisions based on the anticipated effect of a judg-
lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. See 18 JAMES WM. MooRE E T
AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrCE § 133.30[3][a] (3d ed. 1997).
337. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 895 F.2d 254,
262 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying the Ohio mutuality requirement to determine the issue-preclu-
sive effect of a New Jersey judgment in a subsequent Ohio federal court proceeding); Itzkoff
v. F&G Realty of NJ., 890 F. Supp. 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1995) (applying the New Jersey entire
controversy doctrine to determine the preclusive effect of a New York judgment in a subse-
quent New Jersey federal court proceeding); see also supra text accompanying notes 269-73.
338. See Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assn. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey
Police Dept., 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992).
339. In Frier v. City of Vandalia, 770 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1985), for example, the Seventh
Circuit held a section 1983 claim to be claim precluded based upon an Illinois state court
judgment denying replevin. The court cited the full faith and credit statute, recited the rule
that Illinois law governs the preclusive effect of the replevin judgment, and even cited Illinois
claim preclusion cases. See 770 F.2d at 701-02. Nevertheless, the court's ultimate decision
favoring claim preclusion made sense only under the broad federal definition of a claim and
not under the narrower Illinois test, as the concurring Seventh Circuit judge convincingly
demonstrated. See 770 F.2d at 703-06 (Swygert, J., concurring). Compare Salaymeh v. St
Vincent MemL Hosp. Corp., 706 F. Supp. 643, 646-47 (C.D. Ill. 1989), in which the federal
court lamented that it was unable to dismiss on grounds of claim preclusion, because
although the claim arose out of the same transactionas an earlier Illinois lawsuit, it was not
the same cause of action under Illinois preclusion law.
In FDIC v. Continental Casualty Co., 796 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Or. 1991), a federal court,
addressing the effect of a Wisconsin state court judgment, cited the full faith and credit stat-
ute and looked to Wisconsin case law on nonmutual issue preclusion. See 796 F. Supp at
1348. But on the critical question of whether alternative holdings warrant issue-preclusive
effect, the court relied solely on its own Ninth Circuit federal law and did not consider how
Wisconsin courts would treat the issue. See 796 F. Supp. at 1348 (citing In re Westgate-Calif.
Corp., 642 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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ment, we should prefer a simple rule to a more intricate or indeter-
minate one.
Moreover, we should aim for the possible. Given the finding
that courts rarely pause to analyze choice of preclusion law at all, it
would be futile to expect most courts to subscribe to a subtly
nuanced analysis of choice of preclusion law even if it were a good
idea. It may be possible, however, to establish this: courts should
not reflexively apply their own preclusion law to determine the
binding effect of another court's judgment, but they instead nearly
always should apply the preclusion law of the jurisdiction that ren-
dered the judgment.
A decade ago, Professor Stephen Burbank demonstrated the
nuanced treatment that could be applied to intejurisdictional pre-
clusion. In particular, he showed that an F, referent need not re-
quire application of F,'s preclusion law, because federal common
law, Erie analysis, and the Rules of Decision Act 340 may point to
the preclusion law of the state in which federal F, sits or to the
preclusion law of the jurisdiction that supplied the substantive law
at F1.341 Professor Burbank cautioned us not to ignore the inherent
complexity: "We need a law of interjurisdictional preclusion that is
sensitive to the complexity of our federal system .... 342 No court
has reliably adopted such a nuanced approach to choice of preclu-
sion law, however, and there is no reasonable prospect that courts
will do so in the future. Making choice of preclusion law dependent
upon the source of the applicable substantive law leads to non-
transsubstantive preclusion. 343 If courts have been largely unwilling
to apply another jurisdiction's preclusion law even on the simplest
analysis of looking to the jurisdiction that rendered the judgment,
then they are unlikely to apply various other jurisdictions' preclu-
sion law depending upon the substantive interests at stake in each
case.344
340. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
341. See Burbank, supra note 1.
342. Id. at 739; see also Burbank, supra note 302, at 641.
343. See supra note 292.
344. Professor Burbank's argument has the most bite in the state-federal configuration, in
cases implicating substantive federal rights. Because the federal courts generally have shown
greater sensitivity to interjurisdictional concerns in this area, see supra text accompanying
notes 335-39, the state-federal configuration raises less need for judges to have a clear, simple
rule. But litigants and practitioners need a predictable rule in every configuration. More-
over, the litigation policies of F, as embodied in F,'s preclusion rules are equally at stake in
the state-federal configuration. The Supreme Court's repeal analysis, see supra text accom-
panying notes 262-68, provides a suitably narrow safety valve for the protection of federal
substantive interests by federal courts at F2.
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Courts should adopt the following approach to interjurisdic-
tional preclusion: F2 should nearly always apply F1's preclusion law,
regardless of the configuration - state-state, state-federal, or
federal-state - and regardless of the source of the substantive law.
With the two very narrow exceptions of federal partial repeal of
section 173834- and preclusion rules explicitly linked to particular
substantive rights of action,346 the effect of a judgment should be
governed by the preclusion law of the rendering jurisdiction. Pro-
fessor Ronan Degnan proposed such a rule more than twenty years
ago:
A valid judgment rendered in any judicial system within the United
States must be recognized by all other judicial systems within the
United States, and the claims and issues precluded by that judgment,
and the parties bound thereby, are determined by the law of the sys-
tem which rendered the judgment. 347
The intervening years have seen Degnan's proposal dismembered
by commentators348 and ignored by too many courts. But it is as
sound now as it was in 1976 - sounder, in fact, and for reasons that
Professor Degnan only began to uncover.
The need for a clear, reliable rule of interjurisdictional preclu-
sion has grown with the phenomenal growth of multiparty,
multiforum litigation. The unpredictability of choice of preclusion
law and the tendency of many courts unthinkingly to apply their
own preclusion law to other courts' judgments highlight the need
for a clear rule. At this point, the question should not be whether
to have a clear rule, but rather what that rule should be. The an-
swer follows from an examination of the strategic implications of
preclusion law. Each jurisdiction possesses strong interests in litiga-
tion behavior in its courts, and the manifold strategic implications
of preclusion law allow each jurisdiction to use preclusion rules to
guide litigation behavior in accordance with that jurisdiction's value
choices. This works reliably, however, only if practitioners facing
interjurisdictional litigation can count on the applicability of the
rendering court's preclusion law.
This article's analysis of interjurisdictional preclusion suggests
that any court deciding the preclusive effect of a judgment from
345. See supra text accompanying notes 262-68.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 291-93.
347. Degnan, supra note 1, at 773 (emphasis deleted).
348. See WRIGrr Er AL., supra note 104, § 4466, at 618; Burbank, supra note 1, at 736-39;
Shreve, supra note 235, at 1254 n.250. But see Lilly, supra note 18, at 328-29 (favoring appli-
cation of the rendering jurisdiction's preclusion law).
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another U.S. jurisdiction349 ought to apply the preclusion law of the
rendering jurisdiction. This result need not await case-by-case ac-
ceptance. Congress has the power to achieve this result by amend-
ing the full faith and credit statute.350 That statute should be
amended in three ways. First, the statute should be changed to re-
fer to "judicial proceedings of any court of the United States or of
any State, Territory or Possession of the United States," in order to
bring federal judgments within its ambit. Second, to remove any
doubts about the statute's authority as a federal choice of law rule
for interjurisdictional preclusion, the statute should require that
such judicial proceedings receive "the same full faith and credit -
including the identical claim preclusive and issue preclusive effect" as
they have in the jurisdiction from which they are taken. Third, the
statute should explicitly choose F1's preclusion law, rather than
merely an F, referent, by stating that judicial proceedings receive
the identical claim preclusive and issue preclusive effect "as they
have under the law of the jurisdiction from which they are taken."
Choice of preclusion law matters because preclusion law varies,
sometimes dramatically. The predominant interests at stake in
interjurisdictional preclusion are the litigation-related interests of
the forum that rendered the initial judgment. Those interests -
unlike the interests of the later forum that will decide whether to
preclude - are implicated whenever a litigator anticipates the pos-
sibility of future related litigation across jurisdictional lines. In-
terjurisdictional differences in preclusion law matter to the initial
forum, because the details of preclusion law rationally affect litiga-
349. Many of the arguments advanced in this article apply with nearly equal force to the
problem of interjurisdictional preclusion in international litigation. Whether preclusion is
applied internationally, or interjurisdictionally within the United States, F, has significant
interests at stake that point to application of Fl's preclusion law, and the meaning of a judg-
ment should be understood in light of the rendering jurisdiction's view of the judgment's
binding effect. Preclusion in the international context, however, raises issues beyond those
that arise domestically and is beyond the scope of this project. For an example of a court
treating international preclusion differently from domestic interjurisdictional preclusion, see
Alfadda v. Fenn, 966 F. Supp. 1317,1329 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying U.S. law to determine the
issue-preclusive effect of a French judgment, noting that "[n]either the Full Faith and Credit
Act nor the principles of federalism apply to the recognition of foreign country judgments,"
and concluding that "[i]t is thus not clear that federal courts should defer to foreign coun-
tries' issue-preclusion rules").
350. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). Congress's power to achieve this result flows from the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 (authorizing Congress to prescribe the
interjurisdictional effect of state judicial proceedings); the judiciary article, U.S. CoNsr. art.
I, 88 1-2 (in conjunction with U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, authorizing Congress to establish
lower federal courts with judicial power over certain cases and controversies); the Interstate
Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to regulate commerce
among the states); and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (authorizing
Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for executing the various powers of the
United States).
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tion behavior in that forum. While reasonable arguments can be
advanced for applying a multilayered approach to choice of preclu-
sion law, state courts not only never apply such nuanced analysis,
they rarely pay any attention to choice of preclusion law and in-
stead apply their own preclusion law reflexively. This makes it im-
possible for practitioners to predict, at the time of the initial
lawsuit, whose preclusion law will govern the judgment, and leaves
practitioners to make litigation decisions in the dark. For the sake
of predictability - and to give consistent effect to the value choices
implicit in each jurisdiction's preclusion law - interjurisdictional
preclusive effect should be governed by the preclusion law of the
jurisdiction that rendered the judgment. More intricate choice of
preclusion law analysis is unnecessary, unwise, and in any event,
unachievable.
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